Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock by Gilson, Ronald J. & Schizer, David M.
 UNDERSTANDING VENTURE CAPITAL STRUCTURE:
 A TAX EXPLANATION FOR CONVERTIBLE
 PREFERRED STOCK
 Ronald J. Gilson and David M. Schizer
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
 I. Two ELEMENTS OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL LANDSCAPE .................................................. 878
 A. The Ubiquity of Convertible Preferred Stock ................................................................... 879
 B. The Role of Intense Incentives in Venture Capital Contracting ..................................... 88o
 II. CURRENT EXPLANATIONS FOR THE USE OF CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK ........ 88i
 A. The Limited Significance of the Formal Attributes of Convertible Preferred Stock ..... 882
 i. Dividend Preferences ................................................................................. 882
 2. Liquidation Preferences ................................................................................. 883
 3. Allocation of Control ................................................................................. 885
 B. Financial Models of Convertible Preferred Stock in Venture Capital Structure ..... 886
 C. Convertible Preferred Stock Is Not as Pervasive in Other Jurisdictions ... 888
 III. THE IMPACT OF CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK ON THE TAXATION OF
 INCENTIVE COMPENSATION ............................................... ................................... 889
 A. The Importance of the Value of Common Stock in the Tax Treatment of Incentive
 Compensation....................................................................................................................... 893
 i. The Manager Receives Common Stock . ....................................................................... 893
 2. The Manager Receives Stock Options . ......................................................................... 895
 (a) Incentive Stock Options .............................................................................. .... 895
 (b) Nonqualified Stock Options ................................................................................. 896
 B. The Impact of Convertible Preferred Stock on the Valuation of Common Stock .......... 898
 C. Summary ................................................................... . 90I
 IV. ALTERNATIVE TAX STRATEGIES . . ............................................................................... 90I
 A. The Venture Capitalist Receives Convertible Debt ........................................................... 902
 B. The Venture Capitalist Receives a Unit Composed of Straight Preferred Stock
 and Common Stock ................................................................... 905
 C. The Use of Partnership Structure and the Grant of Profits Interests to Managers ...... 907
 V. VALUATION RULES AS A SUBSIDY . ................................................................. 909
 VI. CONCLUSION . . .................................................................................. 9I6
 874
This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Wed, 01 Jun 2016 04:32:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 UNDERSTANDING VENTURE CAPITAL STRUCTURE:
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 The capital structures of venture capital-backed U.S. companies
 share a remarkable commonality: overwhelmingly, venture capitalists
 make their investments through convertible preferred stock.1 Not sur-
 prisingly, much of the academic literature on venture capital has
 sought to explain this peculiar pattern.2 Financial economists have
 developed models showing, for example, that convertible securities ef-
 ficiently allocate control between the investor and entrepreneur,3 signal
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 1 Section I.A., infra, outlines the recent empirical research on venture capital structure. By
 way of background, preferred stock offers investors more senior rights than common stock. 'Ipi-
 cally, preferred stockholders have a prior claim to dividends and proceeds of a liquidation (a term
 that, in the venture capital context, typically includes certain sales of the business as well as
 dissolutions). Preferred stockholders usually also have superior "control" rights. They often have
 extra voting power on certain issues and, in the venture capital context, the right to appoint a
 designated number of the board of directors. Preferred stock is "convertible" if it can be
 exchanged for a designated number of common shares. Such conversion usually occurs at the
 option of the investor but, in the venture capital context, it is also mandatory after a successful
 initial public offering (IPO).
 2 See George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U.
 CHI. L. REV. 305, 322 (200I) (reviewing PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE
 CAPITAL CYCLE (i999)) (noting that convertible preferred stock is a distinctive feature in ven-
 ture capital finance).
 3 See, e.g., THOMAS HELLMANN, IPOs, ACQUISITIONS AND THE USE OF CONVERTIBLE
 SECURITIES IN VENTURE CAPITAL (Graduate Sch. of Bus., Stanford Univ., Research Paper
 No. 1702, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=257608 (explain-
 ing how convertible securities implement "an optimal trade-off between the need to allocate cash
 flows" and the desire to make efficient exit decisions); Erik Berglof, A Control Theory of Venture
 Capital Finance, io J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247, 248 (I994) (noting that the allocation of control and
 returns that convertible preferred stock achieves "protects the initial contracting parties as much
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 the entrepreneur's talent and motivation,4 and align the incentives of
 entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.5
 In this Article, we examine the influence of a more mundane factor
 on venture capital structure: tax law. Portfolio companies6 issue con-
 vertible preferred stock to achieve more favorable tax treatment for
 the entrepreneur and other portfolio company employees. The goal is
 to shield incentive compensation from current tax at ordinary income
 rates, so managers can enjoy tax deferral (until the incentive compen-
 sation is sold, or longer) and a preferential tax rate.7 No tax rule ex-
 as possible against dilution and extracts from a future buyer of the firm"); William W. Bratton,
 Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, ioo MICH. L. REV. 89i
 (2002) (examining preferred stockholders' control when companies perform poorly). But cf.
 STEVEN N. KAPLAN & PER STROMBERG, FINANCIAL CONTRACTING THEORY MEETS
 THE REAL WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS 28 (Ctr.
 for Research in Security Prices, Working Paper No. 5I3, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
 sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=228I34 (stating that control theories "do not fully explain VC financ-
 ings"); Paul A. Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examination of
 Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments 3 (i998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
 with the Harvard Law School Library) ("The use of convertible financing needs to be understood
 in the context of the broad range of control mechanisms that are employed by venture capital-
 ists.").
 4 See, e.g., FRANCESCA CORNELLI & OVED YOSHA, STAGE FINANCING AND THE ROLE
 OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT (London Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 253-I997, I997), available at
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=4858I (finding that convertible securities can
 prevent signal manipulation by the entrepreneur); Jeremy C. Stein, Convertible Bonds as Back-
 door Equity Financing, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 3, I5 (I992) ("A convertible issue reveals a firm to be of
 medium quality, whereas an equity issue reveals a firm to be of bad quality."); Gompers, supra
 note 3, at 27 ("[C]onvertible preferred equity is a potentially effective means of screening out low
 ability entrepreneurs ...."); Leslie M. Marx, Contract Renegotiation in Venture Capital Pro-
 jects 22 (2000) (working paper, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (finding that "good
 entrepreneurs use a combination of debt and the granting of control rights to distinguish them-
 selves from bad entrepreneurs").
 5 See, e.g., Richard C. Green, Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants, I3 J. FIN. ECON.
 II5, I29-30 (i984) (suggesting that convertibles are "particularly well suited to the problem of
 controlling risk incentives"); Leslie M. Marx, Efficient Venture Capital Financing Combining Debt
 and Equity, 3 REV. ECON. DESIGN 37I, 372 (i998) (exploring which capital structure optimizes
 the level of intervention by the venture capitalist); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Gov-
 ernance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 5 IO (I990) (noting that "[fllexible
 conversion terms alter the risk-and-reward-sharing scheme" and encourage entrepreneurs to build
 value); Gompers, supra note 3, at I ("[U]se of a convertible security, as opposed to straight equity
 or straight debt financing, serves to motivate the founder to exert the proper effort and avoid im-
 proper risk taking.").
 6 By "portfolio company," we mean a firm that is financed by a venture capitalist.
 7 Stock that an individual holds for more than one year is generally eligible for the long-term
 capital gains rate. See section i(h). If other conditions are satisfied, including a five-year holding
 period, the owner of stock in a small business is eligible for a further rate reduction under section
 1202. A holder of small business stock can also benefit from the "rollover" rule of section 1045,
 under which tax that otherwise would be due from a sale of stock is deferred if the taxpayer rein-
 vests sale proceeds in other qualifying stock.
 Unless otherwise indicated, the phrase "section" refers to a section of the Internal Revenue
 Code of i986 (I.R.C.), as amended and codified at 26 U.S.C. (2000). The phrase "regulation" re-
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 plicitly connects the employee's tax treatment with the issuance of
 convertible preferred stock to venture capitalists. Rather, this link is
 part of tax "practice" - the plumbing of tax law that is familiar to
 practitioners but, predictably, is opaque to those, including financial
 economists, outside the day-to-day tax practice.8 Despite its obscurity,
 this tax factor is likely of first-order importance.9 Intense incentive
 compensation for portfolio company founders and employees is a fun-
 damental feature of venture capital contracting.10
 Venture capital structure thus performs double duty, addressing
 standard contracting concerns (which are the grist of the existing aca-
 demic literature) while also reducing taxes. Our analysis places con-
 vertible preferred stock at the intersection of two sets of contracts: a
 set of viable "economic" contracts that respond to control, signaling,
 and incentive problems associated with early-stage, high-tech financ-
 ings, and a set of viable "tax" contracts that minimize the tax on incen-
 tive compensation. While some economic contracts yield less desirable
 tax results, and some tax contracts yield less desirable economic re-
 sults, convertible preferred stock reflects the intersection of the two
 sets - a straightforward (and now familiar) way to pursue both eco-
 nomic and tax goals.1" This dual role is the key to its dominant posi-
 tion.
 In elucidating the tax advantages of convertible preferred stock, we
 highlight an important tax subsidy for the venture capital market that
 is well understood among high-tech entrepreneurs and investors, but
 otherwise is largely unknown. Although this subsidy has developed
 inadvertently, it has an interesting structure. The government does
 not provide funds directly to companies it selects (a familiar technique
 fers to regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the Treasury) to imple-
 ment the Internal Revenue Code.
 8 To be sure, this tax strategy is aggressive because it is based on naive economic assump-
 tions, as discussed below. Nonetheless, the tax strategy is widely used, and the tax authorities
 have shown no appetite for challenging it. See infra section III.B.
 9 Of course, tax planning does not always feature prominently in venture capital structure.
 As Professor Bankman shows in an important paper, new ventures are often structured as corpo-
 rations, even though use of the partnership form would enable venture capitalists to maximize the
 tax reduction associated with tax losses. Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-
 Ups, 4I UCLA L. REV. I737, I738 (I994). However, Bankman focuses on the tax treatment of
 venture capitalists, not the entrepreneurs and managers on whom we focus here. Id. at I747. But
 see id. at I740 n.3 (noting the tax benefit that managers gain from convertible preferred stock).
 Empirical evidence suggests that entrepreneurs and managers are indeed tax sensitive. See PAUL
 A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, WHAT DRIVES VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDRAISING? 8 (Nat'l
 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W69o6, i999), available at http://papers.nber.org/
 papers/w69o6.pdf. In addition, the tax planning discussed in this Article strengthens incentive
 compensation, a central feature of venture capital contracting. See infra section I.B.
 10 See infra section I.B.
 II We are grateful to Thomas Hellmann for suggesting this framework.
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 outside the United States12), or to all companies. Instead, venture
 capital investors serve as the subsidy's gatekeepers. As a practical
 matter, only companies that can attract venture capital investment re-
 ceive this tax subsidy. Our analysis thus adds a different twist to the
 familiar debate over whether the government should provide subsidies
 through the tax system, instead of through direct expenditures or fa-
 vorable regulatory treatment. 13
 Finally, as a matter of academic craft, our analysis suggests the dif-
 ficulty of financial modeling for activities in which low-visibility,
 "practice"-level patterns are of first-order significance. Unless in-
 formed by institutional knowledge deep enough to reveal such pat-
 terns, models will miss a significant factor that is influencing behavior.
 The Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the two elements of
 the venture capital landscape on which our analysis builds: the perva-
 sive use of convertible preferred stock and the importance of highly
 incentivized compensation for employees. Part II surveys the current
 range of explanations for the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock.
 Part III explains why granting convertible preferred stock to venture
 capitalists is thought to reduce the tax burden on managers' incentive
 compensation. Part IV considers other ways of pursuing this tax ob-
 jective and shows that each bears potentially significant costs. After
 explaining how the tax advantages that we identify here function as a
 subsidy for venture capital, Part V evaluates the unusual characteris-
 tics of this subsidy's structure.
 I. Two ELEMENTS OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL LANDSCAPE
 Our analysis of the influence of tax law on venture capital structure
 builds on two distinctive features of venture capital contracting. The
 first is the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock. As an empirical
 matter, venture capitalists typically receive this form of security when
 investing in early-stage companies. The second is the pervasiveness of
 incentive compensation. Portfolio company employees receive it as a
 means of addressing the extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry,
 12 See DIRECTORATE GENERAL ENTERPRISES, EUROPEAN COMM'N, EUROPEAN
 TREND CHART ON INNOVATION: TREND REPORT "INNOVATION FINANCE" 5-8 (200I),
 available at http://trendchart.cordis.lu/Reports/Documents/Innovation FinanceDec2000.pdfD;
 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., GOVERNMENT VENTURE CAPITAL FOR TECH-
 NOLOGY-BASED FIRMS 9-I I (I 997).
 13 Compare, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
 Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705, 734 (1970)
 (criticizing tax expenditures), with Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
 Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (i986) (defending tax incentives);
 see also MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION
 AND TAXATION 5 (i999) (assessing "the practical virtues and pitfalls of regulatory taxation").
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 and potential for opportunism inherent in early-stage ventures. 14
 These two elements provide the context for our tax analysis: the use of
 convertible preferred stock as a financing instrument favorably influ-
 ences the tax treatment of portfolio company employees' incentive
 compensation.
 A. The Ubiquity of Convertible Preferred Stock
 The widespread use of convertible preferred stock in the venture
 capital market stands in stark contrast to its use in publicly traded
 corporations. Only some ten percent of U.S. public companies in
 Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT database have an outstanding class
 of convertible preferred stock.'5 In contrast, this security is practically
 the exclusive means of external financing for U.S. venture capital-
 backed companies. Steven Kaplan and Per Stromberg provide the
 most recent data. Their sample includes i i8 U.S. portfolio companies
 and 200 venture capital-backed financing rounds, of which I59 were
 completed between i996 and J999.16 Fourteen different U.S. venture
 capital partnerships led these rounds, and more than ioo different ven-
 ture capital partnerships made investments.'7 Of the 200 rounds, i89,
 or 94.5%, used convertible preferred stock."8 This finding is consistent
 with earlier surveys.19
 Thus, we start our analysis with a clear landmark: a monolith
 dominates the landscape of U.S. venture capital structure. Explaining
 this phenomenon has shaped much of the academic venture capital lit-
 erature.
 14 The term "uncertainty" refers to contingencies that none of the parties can definitively pre-
 dict (for example, the success of a firm's research and commercialization efforts, the market's ul-
 timate receptivity to a firm's product, the success of competing research efforts, and macroeco-
 nomic and industry conditions), while "information asymmetry" refers to circumstances in which
 one party knows more about a particular fact relevant to the business than the other party does
 (for example, an employee or manager knows more about how hard she works than the venture
 capitalist does).
 15 Calculations performed by the authors based on COMPUSTAT data.
 16 KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 9-IO.
 17 Id. at9, II.
 18 Id. at I3. Of the i89 rounds, I59 used convertible preferred stock exclusively (79.5%), while
 an additional 30 included other types of securities as well (bringing the total to 94.5%). See id. at
 50 tbl.i. While 72 rounds used a particular variant of convertible preferred stock called partici-
 pating preferred stock, the difference is not significant to our analysis. See id.
 19 See Gompers, supra note 3, at I5 (noting that in a sample of twenty-eight financing rounds
 completed during the early stage of a venture capital limited partnership, the venture capitalists
 received convertible preferred stock in all but five rounds); see also Sahlman, supra note 5, at 504
 (describing the specific terms involved in structuring convertible preferred stock agreements in
 the venture capital context).
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 B. The Role of Intense Incentives in Venture Capital Contracting
 All financial contracting confronts three fundamental problems:
 uncertainty, information asymmetries, and agency costs.20 These prob-
 lems are especially acute in high-tech startups. Because these ventures
 are in an early stage and the relevant technologies may well be un-
 tested, most of the important decisions bearing on the company's suc-
 cess have not yet been made. This reality exacerbates not only uncer-
 tainty, but also information asymmetries between investors and
 entrepreneurs, as "intentions and abilities are far less observable than
 actions already taken."'21 Entrepreneurs may exploit their informa-
 tional advantage for their private benefit.22 The potential for these
 agency costs is aggravated by the significant variance associated with
 early-stage companies' expected returns.23
 A pivotal response to these contracting problems is the structure of
 the entrepreneur's compensation. Because of information asymmetries
 and uncertainty associated with future management decisions, the con-
 tract between venture capital investors and portfolio company manag-
 ers is incomplete; ex ante, the parties cannot specify what actions the
 managers should take to increase firm value. Perhaps more dramati-
 cally than any other element of venture capital contracting, the portfo-
 lio company's compensation structure responds to this problem by cre-
 ating high-powered performance incentives that align the interests of
 investors and employees. An overwhelming percentage of manage-
 ment's compensation depends on firm performance. The potential for
 dramatic appreciation in the value of stock and options thus offsets
 low salaries.24
 A highly incentivized compensation structure also reduces informa-
 tion asymmetries concerning the skills of entrepreneurs and managers.
 Because an entrepreneur has better information about her skills than
 the venture capital investor, and because a highly incentivized com-
 20 This discussion draws on Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons
 from the American Experience (working paper, forthcoming 55 STAN. L. REV. (2003), on file with
 the Harvard Law School library).
 21 Id. at I3.
 22 See Gompers, supra note 3, at 6.
 23 See generally JOHN H. COCHRANE, THE RISK AND RETURN OF VENTURE CAPITAL
 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8o66, 200I) (noting the high variance of
 venture capital returns).
 24 Using intense managerial performance incentives to align management and investor incen-
 tives also creates a parallel agency problem. In effect, such incentives may encourage managers
 to take unwise risks because their share of potential gains will be considerably larger than their
 share of losses. Other elements of the venture capital contracting structure, especially its govern-
 ance aspects, provide high-powered monitoring to balance the high-powered incentives. See Gil-
 son, supra note 20, at I9-2 I. See generally PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
 ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 240 (I993) (explaining that "more resources should be
 spent monitoring when it is desirable to give strong incentives").
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 sensation structure is worth more to individuals with stronger skills,
 an entrepreneur's willingness to accept such compensation signals her
 skill level. In effect, every intense incentive serves also as a signal.25
 While other elements of venture capital contracting also respond to
 extreme levels of uncertainty, information asymmetries, and agency
 costs, management compensation is central. Thus, we can expect fac-
 tors that facilitate intense incentive compensation to be an important
 influence on venture capital structure. As we will see, this link helps
 explain the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock; using this security
 as a vehicle for venture capital investment reduces the tax cost of im-
 plementing intensely incentivized management compensation.
 II. CURRENT EXPLANATIONS FOR THE USE OF CONVERTIBLE
 PREFERRED STOCK
 A significant literature has sought to explain the ubiquity of con-
 vertible preferred stock in venture capital structure. These accounts
 show that one or more of the formal characteristics of convertible pre-
 ferred stock, as it is used in the venture capital context,26 solve one of
 the incomplete contracting problems that venture capital investment
 presents.27 These theories have explanatory power, in our view, and
 are reinforced by the tendency of contracts to become standardized:
 once a market practice develops, parties find advantages in conformity
 even if the practice is not a perfect fit. Yet the power of standardiza-
 tion should not be overstated, since parties will depart from market
 practice when a departure is profitable enough to overcome the infor-
 mation costs they will incur.28 In addition, standardization does not
 25 Gilson, supra note 20, at 22; Gompers, supra note 3, at 4-5.
 26 The convertible preferred stock typically used in the venture capital context has features
 that are unique to this application. Most important, the overwhelming majority of this converti-
 ble preferred stock provides for automatic conversion on the occurrence of an IPO. Kaplan and
 Stromberg provide empirical evidence of this characteristic. See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra
 note 3, at 2I (noting that venture capital financings commonly include securities with automatic
 conversion provisions, that these conditions generally relate to an IPO, and that they "require the
 IPO to exceed a designated common stock price, dollar amount of proceeds, and/or market capi-
 talization for the company"). Black and Gilson were the first commentators to discuss the incen-
 tive function of this contractual term. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital
 and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 257-64
 (i998) (noting that an IPO enables entrepreneurs to regain control of their ventures).
 27 See sources cited supra notes 3-5, and accompanying text.
 28 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contract-
 ing (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 7I3, 7i8-40 (I997) (arguing that path
 dependency may dictate the continuation of one contracting form among an array of potential
 substitutes); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
 ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 592-609 (i984) (discussing information-cost barriers to introducing
 new capital market instruments).
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 explain how a practice first developed. On this point, four factors sug-
 gest that the prevailing explanations are incomplete.
 First and most important, the core preferences that define con-
 vertible preferred stock - a preference over common stock in divi-
 dend payments and liquidation - have only limited significance in the
 venture capital context. Second, other securities can easily duplicate
 the control features of convertible preferred stock. Third, while the
 conversion feature is said to allocate control between managers and
 venture capitalists on the question whether the firm is sold to an ac-
 quirer or to public investors, in practice this feature is unlikely to op-
 erate as modeled. Finally, existing accounts do not explain why con-
 vertible securities appear to be used less frequently outside the United
 States.
 A. The Limited Significance of the Formal Attributes of Convertible
 Preferred Stock
 Convertible preferred stock provides preferences over common
 stock in three areas: the payment of dividends, priority in liquidation,
 and governance control. None of these preferences is sufficiently ro-
 bust and unique to explain fully the near-universal use of convertible
 preferred stock in the venture capital context.
 i. Dividend Preferences. - Put simply, a dividend preference in
 favor of preferred stock prohibits the payment of a common dividend
 before the payment of a preferred dividend. The critical fact in
 evaluating the importance of this preference is that, according to the
 legal bible of Silicon Valley venture capital investing, "corporations
 being financed with venture capital money are rarely in a position to
 pay dividends to their venture capital investors,"229 let alone to the
 holders of their common stock. And if no dividends are paid on
 common stock, the dividend preference is unimportant.
 To be sure, this preference can prove meaningful in some cases. To
 be effective, the dividend preference must be cumulative, so that pre-
 ferred dividends will accrue even if not currently paid. In that event,
 the barrier to paying a common dividend will grow with time. Mak-
 ing the dividend cumulative, however, is insufficient to make the pref-
 erence meaningful because of the low probability that the portfolio
 company will want to pay a common dividend before the convertible
 preferred stock is converted either in an acquisition or (automatically)
 in an IPO. Thus, a second step is necessary to give the cumulative
 dividend preference real teeth: requiring the company to pay accumu-
 29 Lee F. Benton et al., Hi-Tech Corporation: Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorpora-
 tion, in I VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 8-i, 8-8 (Michael J. Hal-
 loran et al. eds., 3d ed. Supp. 2002).
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 lated preferred dividends before common stockholders receive any li-
 quidity on their investment. Parties can implement this condition me-
 chanically by adding two features. First, they need to incorporate ac-
 cumulated but unpaid dividends into the liquidation preference and
 treat an acquisition of the portfolio company as a liquidation. Second,
 they need to adjust the conversion ratio to reflect accumulated but un-
 paid dividends.
 But a more economically meaningful preference is hardly a univer-
 sal practice:
 [M]ost dividend provisions do not make dividends either mandatory or
 cumulative.... Typically, venture capital financed companies do not rea-
 sonably expect to be able to pay dividends to their stockholders prior to
 going public, at which point the Preferred Stock will have converted into
 Common Stock and the entitlement to dividends will have ceased.30
 2. Liquidation Preferences. - Like the dividend preference, the
 preferred stock's liquidation preference could have economic
 significance in some cases, but often proves insignificant. The reason
 is that the dominant input in early-stage technology companies is
 human capital. In transforming human capital into a product through
 research and development, these ventures often have few hard assets,
 especially if they subcontract out capital-intensive operations like
 manufacturing, so the venture-backed portfolio company engages in
 only human capital-intensive activities. The result undercuts the value
 of the liquidation preference. In liquidation, holders of convertible
 preferred stock cannot expect a significant payment because few, if
 any, assets will remain after creditors are paid. The portfolio company
 presumably will have spent invested cash by then, since venture
 capitalists typically finance firms in stages.31 A failed Internet startup,
 for example, might have a customer list, some computers and Aeron
 30 Id. at 8-8 to 8-9; see also KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at i8 (noting that cumula-
 tive preferred dividends were present in forty-six percent of the financings in their study). Al-
 though some practitioners have expressed the view that Benton and his coauthors understate the
 pervasiveness of cumulative dividends, we suspect that the presence of cumulative dividends is a
 phenomenon similar to that of participating preferred stock in the venture capital context: they
 are of relatively recent origin and affect only a subset of convertible preferred issuances.
 31 See CORNELLI & YOSHA, supra note 4, at i ("Because of the great uncertainty and high
 failure risk of new ventures, a widely used financing technique is the infusion of capital over
 time."); Sahlman, supra note 5, at 506 ("Venture capitalists rarely, if ever, invest all the external
 capital that a company will require to accomplish its business plan: instead, they invest in compa-
 nies at distinct stages in their development."). While venture capitalists obviously will not want
 to share their invested cash with the entrepreneur and managers in the unusual circumstance in
 which assets remain after paying off creditors, venture capitalists have other means to prevent
 such a transfer, aside from a preference. For instance, they can effectively give themselves a veto
 by requiring a supermajority vote for a liquidation.
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 chairs, and maybe a patent, but is also likely to owe back-rent, payroll,
 and other liabilities.32
 This is not to say that the liquidation preference has no impact, but
 rather that its impact occurs in circumstances other than a "real" liq-
 uidation following a portfolio company's failure. A merger or sale of
 substantially all the assets of the portfolio company typically counts as
 a liquidation that triggers the liquidation preference. In such cases,
 the venture capitalists have a prior claim on acquisition proceeds and
 are thus entitled to the lion's share of the sale of a "zombie" venture
 whose business essentially breaks even.33
 For instance, assume that venture capitalists invest $i million in a
 firm for io,ooo shares of convertible preferred, which would represent
 50% of the common stock upon conversion, while managers pay
 $IO,ooo for ioooo shares of common. If the firm is ultimately sold for
 $I.3 million, the venture capitalists would not convert; instead, they
 would collect their $i million liquidation preference, while common
 shareholders would receive $300,000.
 Venture capitalists can claim an even larger share of acquisition
 proceeds if they receive "participating" preferred securities, a type of
 convertible preferred stock that enables venture investors to share in
 the proceeds of "liquidation" along with the common shareholders if
 the proceeds exceed the amount of the preference. In the above exam-
 ple, venture investors would claim their $i million liquidation prefer-
 ence and also receive half of the remaining $300,000, leaving common
 shareholders with only $150,000.
 Admittedly, the preference would have a real effect in this context,
 protecting the venture capitalists' investment in zombie cases.34 Even
 if this scenario constitutes only a subset of cases, lawyers presumably
 would still want to provide for it, since lawyers are supposed to worry
 about even remote risks. Yet while the zombie scenario certainly helps
 to explain the preference, we wonder whether it looms so large in the
 parties' minds as to be the sole, or even the main, determinant of capi-
 tal structure; after all, the stereotypical risky venture-backed firm is
 either a "home run" or a total failure. Moreover, the importance of the
 participation feature should not be overstated, since it is both recent in
 32 One way to test whether Internet startups have assets in liquidation is to ask whether failed
 ventures have filed for bankruptcy - a proceeding that would be worthwhile only if there were
 assets remaining to divide up among creditors. Based on conversations with practitioners, we
 understand that few companies file such bankruptcies. We spoke with half a dozen practitioners
 based in Silicon Valley during 200i and 2002. These practitioners requested that their names and
 affiliations not be disclosed.
 33 Practitioners sometimes refer to this scenario as "going sideways."
 34 Even in this scenario, in which the preferences appear to be meaningful, there may be a
 risk, as William Bratton suggests, that a court would not respect such a preference. See Bratton,
 supra note 3, at 925 (noting that case law, especially in Delaware, is hostile to preferences).
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 origin35 and present in only some thirty-six percent of convertible pre-
 ferred issuances.36 Something else must be at work to explain this
 long-term trend.
 A second effect of the preference - especially if participating pre-
 ferred securities are used - is to encourage venture capitalists to favor
 exit through acquisitions rather than through IPOs. While venture
 capitalists retain their preference in an acquisition, they lose it in a
 successful IPO because their securities automatically convert to com-
 mon stock.37 This effect is also unlikely to be sufficient to account for
 the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock. Venture investors and
 portfolio company management may well favor different means of exit,
 especially since an acquisition typically will change management's po-
 sition dramatically. A participation feature may exacerbate this ten-
 sion. However, management's exit preference can be expected to be a
 subject of ex ante bargaining,38 and as a practical matter, allocation of
 control over exit is not fully contractable. While it is easy to arm ei-
 ther party with a formal veto, it is difficult to provide an exclusive ap-
 proval right, because either party will typically have the practical ca-
 pacity to block either track. Negotiation of an acquisition over
 management's objections or of an IPO over the venture capitalists' ob-
 jections is thus unlikely to be successful.
 3. Allocation of Control. - A final characteristic of convertible
 preferred stock is that it facilitates the separation of control and cash
 flow rights. Venture capitalists typically have more control rights than
 cash flow rights (for example, they might claim more than half of the
 board seats but only one-quarter of the profits from an IPO). This
 setup enables venture capitalists to monitor the firm without corre-
 spondingly reducing managers' share of profits, a step that would un-
 dermine management incentives.39 In this investor-oriented control
 structure, venture capitalists receive board seats, and detailed cove-
 nants protect investors from management opportunism in specified
 contexts. To be clear, the formal elements of convertible preferred
 stock do play a role in separating control from cash flow rights. The
 form has a greater effect here than in the case of liquidation and divi-
 dend preferences.
 35 See Benton et al., supra note 29, at 8-II (describing the use of participating preferred stock
 as "[t]he most significant change during recent years in the terms of the Preferred Stock being is-
 sued").
 36 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at I3. Participating preferred stock also offers
 tax advantages over traditional convertible preferred stock. For a discussion, see infra notes 96,
 I05, I07, and accompanying text.
 37 See HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 3. The IPO typically must attain a specified valuation in
 order to trigger automatic conversion.
 38 See id. at 5; Black & Gilson, supra note 26, at 258-59.
 39 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 6; Gompers, supra note 3, at 3.
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 However, other securities can accomplish the same result, which
 suggests that the separation of control and cash flow rights cannot
 alone explain the prevalence of convertible preferred stock. As Profes-
 sor Thomas Hellmann puts it, "there are typically several ways of
 combining standard securities to implement the same optimal con-
 tract.... These are thus different labels for the same solution."40
 Covenants can appear not only in the terms of the preferred stock, but
 also in a purely contractual investors' rights agreement; in fact, in the
 typical transactions, restrictions appear in both documents.41 Like-
 wise, while a transaction can allocate board representation between
 common and preferred stockholders, it can also allocate representation
 among different classes of common stock.42
 To an extent, the pervasiveness of convertible preferred stock
 probably derives from efficiencies of standardization.43 Yet the ques-
 tion remains why this security became the market standard in the first
 place.
 B. Financial Models of Convertible Preferred Stock in Venture Capital
 Structure
 The financial economics literature offers three explanations for the
 ubiquity of convertible preferred stock in venture capital structure:
 creating incentives and signaling, separating cash flow and control,
 and allocating control rights in decisions about exit.44 While we ad-
 mire the analysis in these models, we question whether they can fully
 40 HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 20; see also KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 26 ("In
 the contracts we study, control rights are important and separate from cash flow rights."); Gomp-
 ers, supra note 3, at 3 ("The use of convertible financing needs to be understood in the context of a
 broad array of control mechanisms that are employed by venture capitalists."). Kaplan and
 Str6mberg found that the venture capitalist has significant control before the IPO and that con-
 trol mechanisms are separable from cash flow allocation. See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra
 note 3, at 24 ("VC financings allow VCs to separately allocate cash flow rights, voting rights,
 board rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights.").
 41 See Robert V. Gunderson, Jr. & Lee F. Benton, Hi-Tech Corporation: Investors' Rights
 Agreement, in i VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 9-I, 9-34 (Michael
 J. Halloran et al. eds., 3d ed. Supp. 200I). Kahan and Yermack note that covenants are costly to
 renegotiate and thus argue that convertibility is a superior alternative for publicly traded bonds,
 because in this context renegotiation costs are high. See Marcel Kahan & David Yermack, In-
 vestment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities, I4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. I36, I40 (i998).
 But Gompers responds that renegotiation is much cheaper in the VC context, and so covenants
 should be - and are - used. See Gompers, supra note 3, at 9-i0.
 42 See JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND
 ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS I 205.i, at 2-22 (2001) ("[Entrepreneur] and VC can
 agree upon an allocation of directors completely different from the equity split through the use of:
 [a] voting trust agreement[, a] voting trust[, v]oting and nonvoting common[, v]oting and nonvot-
 ing preferred[, and e]lection of different classes of directors by different classes of stock.").
 43 See generally Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28.
 44 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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 explain, to use Kaplan and Str6mberg's phrase, "real world" venture
 capital structure.45 As the previous section suggests, these efforts to
 derive optimal financial contracts, and then to observe their appear-
 ance in the real world, present three problems.
 First, they assume that the dividend and liquidation preferences of
 convertible preferred stock are robust in the context of early-stage ven-
 ture capital contracting. This assumption is particularly important in
 incentive and signaling models, which rely on the liquidation prefer-
 ence to make deals unattractive to low-quality entrepreneurs and
 managers. Yet if the liquidation preference has only limited signifi-
 cance, as we have argued, these models have less explanatory power.
 Other than in the zombie scenario, there should be little difference be-
 tween the prevailing capital structure and an all-common capital struc-
 ture. Thus, while the models explain the right to convert as a way of
 mitigating a manager's incentive to increase risk (because the conver-
 sion right allows the venture capital investor to share in any upside re-
 sulting from managerial risk-taking),46 the same mitigation should also
 occur in an all-common capital structure. Convertible preferred stock
 is used, the models claim, to protect the venture capitalist if the ven-
 ture fares poorly, allowing managers to profit only from good out-
 comes. The preference thus should encourage good management per-
 formance and, relatedly, signal the quality of managers who accept this
 incentive. But again, if the preference has only limited significance,
 incentives and signals should be similar to those in an all-common
 capital structure.47
 Second, the models assume, typically implicitly, that convertible
 preferred stock is necessary to separate control from cash flow.48
 However, this desired allocation of control does not require a cash flow
 preference. Different control rights could just as easily be assigned to
 different classes of securities having the same cash flow rights, for in-
 stance, through an all-common capital structure coupled with a share-
 45 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 2 ("Venture capitalists ... are real world en-
 tities who most closely approximate the investors of theory.").
 46 See Gompers, supra note 3, at I5 (stating that because entrepreneurs are typically not moni-
 tored on a day-to-day basis and have the ability to cut corners in their desire to get to the market
 quickly, convertible securities are one mechanism that venture capitalists can use to reduce such
 risk-taking); cf. Green, supra note 5, at I25 (describing the risk-incentive problem in the context of
 convertible debt).
 47 For the same reason, the liquidation preference should not be especially effective in motivat-
 ing venture capitalists to intervene to save failing ventures. Cf. Marx, supra note 5, at 372
 ("[W]hile pure debt gives the venture capitalist too great an incentive to intervene, and pure eq-
 uity too little, a mixed debt-equity sharing rule enables the optimal level of intervention to be
 achieved.").
 48 Hellmann's model is a notable exception. See HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 8-I3.
This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Wed, 01 Jun 2016 04:32:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 888 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. ii6:874
 holders' agreement.49 To be sure, one might respond that this alterna-
 tive is functionally identical to a capital structure featuring a converti-
 ble preferred security, but this response makes the issue far too easy.
 The models do not limit themselves to deriving the optimal financial
 contract for venture capital structure, but also seek to explain the se-
 curity choices actually observed. Thus, the models may explain the
 substantive characteristics of venture capital structure, itself no small
 accomplishment, but they do not fully explain the market's remarkable
 convergence on a single form of security.
 Third, Thomas Hellmann's interesting model highlights the impact
 of security design on the allocation of the power to choose an exit
 method - either an IPO or an acquisition.50 Yet it is doubtful that
 the parties can fully contract in advance about exit in a venture capi-
 tal-backed corporation, because human capital is the dominant nonfi-
 nancial input. In an IPO, for example, it may be extremely difficult to
 secure an underwriter if the venture capitalists oppose the offering.
 Similarly, negotiating an acquisition may be extremely difficult if man-
 agement opposes the transaction and can be expected not to cooperate
 in the buyer's due diligence investigations and in transition efforts.
 Managers have particular clout in a human capital-dominated com-
 pany, because transition is the mechanism that helps transfer the com-
 pany's most important assets. In any event, Hellmann recognizes that
 parties can formally implement the substance of an optimal contract in
 a variety of ways. Thus, the model is insufficient to explain the form
 of security actually observed in the market."
 C. Convertible Preferred Stock Is Not as Pervasive in Other
 Jurisdictions
 Finally, existing accounts do not explain why convertible securities
 appear less frequently in other jurisdictions. For instance, in a recent
 empirical study, Professor Douglas Cumming found that American
 venture capitalists are much less likely to use convertible preferred eq-
 49 William Bratton argues that a preference is needed to transfer control automatically to the
 venture capitalist when the portfolio company enters bankruptcy. See Bratton, supra note 3, at
 gio-ii. However, such a transfer would not necessarily occur automatically. As Bratton ac-
 knowledges, bankruptcy is "a drastic and costly step to have to take," id. at 911, and there is a
 risk that preferences will not be respected in bankruptcy. Given these costs and risks, venture
 capitalists may well be unable to use bankruptcy as a means of strengthening their negotiating
 positions.
 50 See HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 4 ("We examine how venture capital contracts optimally
 allocate control rights and cash flow rights in a world where there is some uncertainty about
 whether exit should occur through an acquisition or an IPO.").
 51 For this reason, Black and Gilson rely on an implicit contract governing the entrepreneur's
 right to choose an IPO backed up by a reputation market. See Black & Gilson, supra note 26, at
 254-56.
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 uity to finance Canadian companies than they are to finance American
 ones.52 If these securities truly are the best way to address incomplete
 contracting problems in the venture capital setting, why are they not
 prevalent everywhere? Variables absent in other jurisdictions must be
 present in the United States that make this capital structure especially
 appealing. In the following Part, we show that U.S. tax law is one
 such variable.53
 III. THE IMPACT OF CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK ON THE
 TAXATION OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION
 To this point, we have shown that existing explanations for the
 widespread use of convertible preferred stock have explanatory power
 but do not tell the whole story. The security's superior cash flow
 rights often lack economic significance - indeed, the zombie scenario
 is the only one in which the liquidation preference appears to have real
 bite. In contrast, the security's superior control rights do have broad
 economic significance, but can be replicated easily. Why, then, is con-
 vertible preferred stock so dominant? In part, the answer may lie in
 the tendency of contracts to become standardized, but the question
 remains how this form became the market practice.
 Another critical factor, U.S. tax law, has largely escaped academic
 notice. Specifically, by awarding convertible preferred stock to ven-
 ture capitalists, portfolio companies seek to lower the tax burden on
 management's incentive compensation. Because such high-powered
 incentives are central to venture capital contracting, this tax advantage
 is a key reason for the security's pervasiveness.
 52 See Douglas J. Cumming, United States Venture Capital Financial Contracting: Evidence
 from Investments in Foreign Securities 2 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Har-
 vard Law School Library), available at http://hal-web.usc.edu/cleo/ALEA/cumming.pdf (noting
 that convertible securities are not the most commonly used capital structure for American venture
 capital in Canada). In our conversations with Canadian tax and corporate practitioners, some
 described convertible preferred stock as a commonly used financing device, as in the United
 States, while others warned of adverse Canadian tax consequences from using this security, see
 infra note 6o, and indicated that other securities are more commonly used, including convertible
 debt or multiple classes of common stock. Like Canadians, Europeans also use convertible pre-
 ferred stock somewhat less frequently than do Americans. See ANDREAS BASCHA & UWE
 WALZ, FINANCING PRACTICES IN THE GERMAN VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY: AN
 EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT I3-I4 (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 2002/o8, 2002), avail-
 able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=267572 (noting that convertible pre-
 ferred stock is used less frequently in Germany); ARMIN SCHWIENBACHER, AN EMPIRICAL
 ANALYSIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL EXITS IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (EFA
 2002 Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
 cfm?abstractjid=30200I (observing that the use of convertible preferred stock is less common in
 European venture capital transactions).
 53 Our preliminary analysis also suggests that because of differences in the Canadian tax sys-
 tem, convertible preferred securities can pose special tax problems in Canada and are less neces-
 sary to achieve analogous tax goals. See infra note 6o.
This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Wed, 01 Jun 2016 04:32:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 890 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. ii6:874
 The critical event in this context is the awarding of common stock
 or options to the founding entrepreneur and other portfolio company
 managers near in time to a venture capital financing round. New eq-
 uity incentives for management and new funding for the company
 typically go hand in hand. A round of venture capital financing will
 prompt the firm to expand and set new targets, occasions that require
 the firm to hire new managers and create further incentives for exist-
 ing employees.54
 When a manager receives equity in a venture capital-backed com-
 pany, U.S. tax law regards this equity as yielding a blend of compensa-
 tion for services ("compensatory return") and appreciation in the value
 of an investment ("investment return").55 The manager has a strong
 tax preference for investment return for two reasons. First, compensa-
 tory return is generally taxed earlier than investment return. In an
 early-stage venture, such accelerated timing is a particular hardship:
 entrepreneurs and managers typically do not have cash to pay taxes
 because their equity compensation is not yet liquid. Second, compen-
 satory return is taxed at the rate for ordinary income, which is ap-
 proximately double the rate applicable to long-term capital gain. An
 even lower rate can apply to investment return, moreover, if the man-
 ager's equity qualifies as "small business stock" and certain other con-
 ditions are satisfied.56 Given these differences, the manager will
 strongly prefer to pay tax as an investor, and the firm will have a par-
 allel preference in order to contain the cost of offering incentive com-
 pensation.57
 54 For example, it is not uncommon for venture capitalists to condition the funding of a financ-
 ing round on the portfolio company's hiring of an important executive. See KAPLAN &
 STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 20.
 55 The premise here is that the entrepreneur is contributing services instead of intellectual
 property. If the parties can characterize the entrepreneur's contribution as property, the rules re-
 garding compensation would not apply. Instead, the entrepreneur would not owe any tax upon
 contributing the property to the venture, would have carry-over basis in the stock equal to her
 basis in the contributed property, and would have capital gain or loss upon selling the stock. In
 such a case, the tax planning strategies described above for converting ordinary compensation
 income to capital gain would not be necessary. Yet many types of contributions cannot be charac-
 terized as property. New employees face the additional hurdle that they must invest by them-
 selves - and not as part of a group of investors who control the firm, as required under section
 35I. See LEVIN, supra note 42, ? 20I.I, at 2-5 to 2-6.
 56 The maximum stated ordinary income tax rate in 2002 is 38.6%, although the effective tax
 burden is higher when payroll taxes and the phaseout of various deductions are considered. In
 contrast, the maximum stated rate for long-term capital gain on stock is 20%. See id. at 2-5. Un-
 der section I202, this rate is reduced to I4% if various conditions, including a five-year holding
 period, are satisfied, although the alternative minimum tax may soak up some of this additional
 savings. See id. ? 20I.I, at 9-26 n.i.
 57 Of course, the tax disadvantage to the manager of receiving ordinary income is theoretically
 offset by a tax advantage to the new firm. It can deduct amounts that managers include as ordi-
 nary income, but not amounts included as capital gain. Obviously, in deciding whether an ar-
 rangement truly is tax-advantaged, we must consider the tax position of all parties to a transac-
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 Given the conceptual and practical difficulties of separating com-
 pensatory and investment returns, tax law relies on formal conventions
 to draw these boundaries. Planners, in turn, game these lines to
 achieve a kind of tax alchemy - transmuting compensatory return
 into investment return. For instance, when managers receive stock as
 compensation, they commonly elect to pay tax on the compensatory re-
 turn right away at ordinary income rates - when the stock still has a
 low value - so that subsequent appreciation is taxed as investment
 return. There is a real tradeoff here: to obtain a lower rate and tax de-
 ferral for future profits, the manager must pay a current tax on the
 profit to date - a tax that would not otherwise be due yet - thereby
 forgoing the use of these tax dollars. Is this tradeoff favorable? The
 answer is clearly "yes" if the profit to date - and thus the currently
 taxed ordinary income - is a very low amount or, better yet, zero. A
 low initial tax valuation of the stock is critical to this tax alchemy so
 that the lion's share of the manager's return can be taxed more fa-
 vorably. Planners use an analogous strategy - which also depends on
 a low tax valuation for the common stock - when a manager receives
 an option grant.
 Thus, from a tax planning perspective, much depends on the valua-
 tion of the portfolio company's common stock at the time the manager
 receives equity compensation. The problem is that this award typi-
 cally coincides with a venture capital financing round. Although the
 manager wants a low valuation for her own stock for tax purposes, she
 still wants venture capitalists to pay a high price for their investment.
 To see the tension between these goals, suppose that a company simul-
 taneously sells common stock to venture capital investors at $ioo per
 share and to managers at $i per share. Without more, managers who
 elect to be taxed on the stock's grant-date value would have $99 of
 current ordinary income, reflecting their bargain purchase of the port-
 tion. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain
 Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF
 THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 27I (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., i988). It is well understood that if
 the firm were in the same tax bracket as the manager, the tax strategy described above would not
 make sense. Cf. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLAN-
 NING APPROACH 20I-02 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the tax inefficiency of incentive stock options if
 the employer and the employee are subject to the same tax rate). Yet in the venture capital con-
 text, the firm's effective tax rate is typically much lower. If the firm is taxed as a corporation, as
 is usually the case, it has vastly more deductions than income in its early years and is not likely to
 pay tax for an extended period of time. Not only is the present value of compensation deductions
 much reduced, but these deductions also could be lost entirely if the firm experiences certain own-
 ership changes. See section 382. If instead the firm is a partnership, the partners could theoreti-
 cally use the deductions, but many of them would be tax exempt in the usual case. Moreover,
 even taxable partners may be unable to use these deductions because of the passive loss rules. See
 section 469. Thus, the conventional wisdom in such tax planning is to favor the tax position of
 the manager, not of the firm.
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 folio company's stock.58 In contrast, if the venture capitalist invests
 instead in convertible preferred stock, managers are likely to claim a
 much lower valuation for their common stock, thereby avoiding this
 up-front tax.
 At this point, the reader should recognize an apparent inconsis-
 tency. For the common stock to have a low value, the preferred stock
 must be worth more. The most likely claim for a difference in value is
 the preferred stock's superior cash flow rights. Yet, as we emphasized
 previously, these preferences have limited significance in the venture
 capital context. As a result, the premium accorded to convertible pre-
 ferred stock should be correspondingly modest. Indeed, the main
 source of value in both convertible preferred and common stock is the
 same: so-called "option" value, or the possibility of earning superior re-
 turns if the venture succeeds. Since the tax advantage sought here
 rests on economically naive assumptions, a caveat is in order. While
 we believe the use of convertible preferred stock in venture capital-
 backed portfolio companies is tax motivated, we do not mean to sug-
 gest that this tax strategy is unassailable - merely that it is unas-
 sailed. Yet tax planners have commonly employed this aggressive
 strategy and, in the venture capital context, tax authorities have not
 routinely challenged it.A9
 To develop these points, this Part explains the tax rules governing
 awards of equity or options to portfolio company managers, and how
 convertible preferred stock figures into a strategy to reduce the tax cost
 of incentivizing managers, whether the compensation is common stock,
 incentive stock options, or nonqualified options. To be sure, tax rules
 alone do not provide a full explanation for the popularity of converti-
 ble preferred stock. In the United States, the tax planning goal
 transmuting the manager's compensatory return into investment re-
 turn - can be accomplished with at least three alternative securities:
 convertible debt, a unit composed of straight preferred stock and
 common stock, or partnership "profits" interests. However, as Part IV
 demonstrates, the first two alternatives introduce other tax or business
 disadvantages. The third has a distinct tax advantage, but is usually
 considered too complicated.60
 58 See infra p. 894.
 59 To use the language of lawyers, we would not necessarily give a legal opinion that the strat-
 egy "works," but we understand that aggressive valuations are routinely used.
 60 An exploration of Canadian tax considerations is beyond this Article's scope (and, indeed,
 beyond our expertise). Our preliminary sense, based on conversations with Canadian corporate
 and tax practitioners, is that the use of convertible preferred stock as a tax-planning strategy in
 Canada is at once more difficult and less necessary than in the United States. This practice is
 more difficult because firms that issue certain types of preferred stock can be subject to various
 adverse tax consequences, including a special tax upon paying dividends. See, e.g., ROBERT
 COUZIN, FOREIGN INCOME: BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN CANADA, at A-57 to A-59 (BNA Tax
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 A. The Importance of the Value of Common Stock in the Tax
 Treatment of Incentive Compensation
 The first step in our analysis is to explain why common stock's
 grant-date value affects the manager's tax treatment when the man-
 ager's compensation is either stock or options. Then, we will consider
 how the common stock's valuation is affected when the venture capi-
 talist receives convertible preferred stock instead of common stock.
 i. The Manager Receives Common Stock. - Assume that a portfo-
 lio company has secured a commitment from a venture capital firm to
 invest $i million in exchange for io,ooo common shares (that is, to pay
 $ioo per share), while the founding entrepreneurs hold another io,ooo
 common shares. Further assume that, in anticipation of growth, the
 company recruits a new chief executive officer and chief financial offi-
 cer at the same time. To align their incentives with those of the ven-
 ture capitalist, each officer purchases approximately five percent of the
 company's common stock as part of her employment contract: iioo
 shares each (out of 22,200 post-issuance outstanding shares) at $i per
 share.61
 Management Portfolio 995-2d, I997). The practice is less necessary because other strategies can
 help executives attain deferral and a reduced tax rate. See generally Daniel Sandler, The Tax
 Treatment of Employee Stock Options: Generous to a Fault, 49 CANADIAN TAX J. 259 (200I).
 Specifically, under section 7 of the Canadian Income Tax Act, an employee who receives a com-
 pensatory option: (i) is not taxable until the option is exercised; and (2) the tax rate on this gain is
 reduced by half (or, to be more precise, a deduction is allowed for half of the taxable amount).
 See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. I (5th Supp.), pt. I, ? 7 (I992); see also Sandler, supra, at 272-73.
 This provision in effect gives the employee deferred low-tax treatment without requiring elabo-
 rate structuring. Nevertheless, there may still be advantages to reducing the initial value of the
 common and thus to using convertible preferred securities (or some other senior security). First,
 the treatment described above, like the ISO regime, is available only if the exercise price on the
 option is not less than the common's fair market value on the grant date. Second, the analysis
 changes if the venture qualifies as a Canadian controlled private corporation under section I25(7)
 of the Canadian Income Tax Act. See id. On one hand, the above exercise price requirement is
 then waived (reducing the need for convertible preferred). See id. at 273-74. On the other hand,
 a $5oo,ooo exclusion is provided for capital gain. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. I (5th Supp.)
 pt. i, ? iio.6; Sandler, supra, at 273-74. Thus, even though profit earned before exercise is still
 taxed at a reduced rate, profit earned after exercise is taxed at an even lower rate (o% for the first
 $5oo,ooo). There would seem to be an advantage, then, in shifting gains to the period after exer-
 cise, a role that convertible preferred securities could play. It would be worthwhile to explore
 whether convertible preferred securities are more commonly used in Canadian-controlled private
 corporations than in other Canadian ventures. In any event, we encourage others with the requi-
 site expertise to analyze the implications of Canadian tax law more thoroughly.
 61 Thus, the venture capitalists and founders each have 45.05% of the firm, while the execu-
 tives each have 4.95%. This hypothetical seems reasonable in light of the empirical evidence con-
 cerning senior-management equity stakes in venture capital-backed companies. See, e.g., Mal-
 colm P. Baker & Paul A. Gompers, Executive Ownership and Control in Newly Public Firms:
 The Role of Venture Capitalists (i999) (working paper, on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
 brary), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=i65I73 (showing that, on
 average, CEOs of venture capital-backed firms held i9% of equity prior to any IPO).
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 This simple deal saddles the new managers with a prohibitively
 high tax bill. When service providers receive property as compensa-
 tion, such as the common stock in our example, they generally pay tax,
 at ordinary income rates, based on the property's fair market value.62
 The rule is simplest if the property is fully vested. When the managers
 receive their stock, they owe tax based on the difference between the
 $iioo each paid and the shares' fair market value. Each manager's
 shares are arguably worth $iio,ooo, because the venture capitalist
 paid this amount per share.63 Thus, each manager would have ap-
 proximately $io9,000 of ordinary income, a daunting prospect for a
 manager whose cash salary may be insufficient to offset the tax.
 Thereafter, each manager has a $iio,ooo basis in the shares and will
 have capital gain or loss on any appreciation or depreciation realized
 when she ultimately sells the shares (or later, if she reinvests the sale
 proceeds in qualifying small business stock).64 Thus, the sizable com-
 pensatory return is taxed initially and the investment return is taxed
 later.
 The story is a bit more complicated if the managers' shares are
 subject to a vesting requirement, as is commonplace, but the undesir-
 able result remains the same as long as the managers make a popular
 tax election. Assume the shares do not vest for three years. Under the
 default rule, no income is recognized and no tax is due until this vest-
 ing date. The amount of income recognized depends on the shares'
 value on the vesting date, not their value on the grant date.65 If each
 manager's shares are worth $5.5 million after three years, that entire
 value (less the $iioo each paid for the shares) is taxed as ordinary in-
 come on the vesting date. The manager owes the tax even if she does
 not (or cannot) sell the shares, because, for example, there is not yet a
 public market for the company's stock. To avoid this outcome, man-
 agers typically make a section 83(b) election. They pay tax as if the
 shares were vested from the beginning (that is, the managers have or-
 dinary income based on grant-date fair market value).66 No other tax
 62 See section 83(a); Treas. Reg. ? i.83-i(a).
 63 A more aggressive pro-taxpayer argument, sometimes advanced by practitioners, is that the
 manager's stock - which represents 4.95% of the firm - should be valued at 4.95% of the value
 of the $i million contributed by the venture capitalist, or $49,500. The premise here is that the
 firm's value is given by this cash contribution (for example, assuming that only this cash would
 remain if the firm liquidated immediately). But this theory fails to explain why the venture capi-
 talist was willing to pay $i million for less than half of the firm - a fact strongly suggesting that
 the firm's value exceeds $2 million. For a discussion of these alternative valuation theories in an
 all-common capital structure, see LEVIN, supra note 42, ? 202.i.i, at 2-4 to 2-5. For a critique of
 the liquidation method of valuing a start-up, see infra pp. 898-goo.
 64 See section I145.
 65 See Treas. Reg. ? i.83-I(f).
 66 See Morton v. Comm'r, I997 T.C.M. (RIA) I 97,i66, at I095, II03 ("Generally, fair market
 value is 'the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a will-
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 is due until the shares are sold, and long-term capital gains rates apply
 to the sale if the holding period has been satisfied.67 Under the elec-
 tion, then, subsequent appreciation is taxed more favorably than the
 stock's initial value (that is, as deferred long-term capital gains instead
 of immediate ordinary income).
 For the managers' tax treatment, then, the key fact is the value of
 their shares on the grant date. If this valuation derives from the close-
 in-time price that venture capitalists paid, the managers confront the
 worst possible outcome: paying a large current tax at ordinary income
 rates, while holding illiquid stock and little or no cash.
 2. The Manager Receives Stock Options. - Valuation also plays a
 central role when the managers' incentive compensation takes the
 form of stock options. These options come in two varieties: "incentive
 stock options" (ISOs) and "nonqualified stock options" (NQOs). A low
 grant-date valuation of the common stock is helpful here for two rea-
 sons. First, it enables options to qualify as ISOs, which offer the man-
 ager significant tax advantages. Second, if the options cannot qualify
 as ISOs, and must instead be tax-disadvantaged NQOs, well-advised
 managers can use self-help to minimize the tax disadvantages of NQO
 status - in effect, to simulate ISOs - as long as they can claim a low
 valuation for the underlying common stock at the time of exercise (for
 example, if the options are exercised on the grant date).
 (a) Incentive Stock Options. - ISOs offer generous tax treatment
 to managers and thus are more desirable than NQOs in the venture
 capital context.68 As long as certain statutory preconditions are
 satisfied, managers generally do not include the value of the options in
 income either when they receive the options or when they exercise
 them.69 Tax is due later - at capital gains rates - when managers
 ing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and both having reasonable knowl-
 edge of the relevant facts."' (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 4II U.S. 546, 551 (I970))). The
 fair market value of these shares, when received, is not discounted for the fact that these shares
 have not yet vested. See section 83(b); see also Tleas. Reg. ? i.83-2.
 67 See Treas. Reg. ? i.83-2(a) (providing that "no compensation will be includible in gross in-
 come when such property becomes substantially vested"); id. ? i.83-4(a) (providing that the hold-
 ing period for transferred property begins just after it has been transferred). As noted previously,
 a lower rate will apply to qualifying small business stock. See supra note 56. If the taxpayer sub-
 sequently forfeits the property, she generally cannot deduct the previously included amount. See
 section 83(b).
 68 Unlike NQOs, ISOs offer no tax deduction to the employer. Thus, it is well understood that
 ISOs are less tax efficient if the manager and employer are subject to the same tax rate. See, e.g.,
 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 57, at 20I-02. As noted above, however, the employer in the ven-
 ture capital context is typically subject to a very low effective tax rate. See supra note 5 7.
 69 See sections 42i(a) and 422; IYeas. Reg. ? 14a.422A-I. However, the managers may be sub-
 ject to alternative minimum tax ("AMT"). This regime, a backup for the income tax, was in-
 tended to prevent wealthy taxpayers from making excessive use of so-called tax "preferences,"
 such as generous depreciation deductions. The "spread" on an ISO is treated as a tax preference,
 causing AMT to be levied on the difference between the exercise price and the underlying stock's
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 sell the stock they have received by exercising the option. In effect, the
 managers' entire profit is deferred and then taxed as investment
 return, not as compensatory return. With NQOs, in contrast, profit
 earned before managers exercise the options is taxed as ordinary
 income.
 Yet in order for options to qualify for ISOs' souped-up tax treat-
 ment, the statute imposes a precondition relating to valuation: the op-
 tion exercise price cannot be less than the value of the underlying
 stock on the grant date.70 Using our example from Part III, if venture
 capitalists have just paid $ioo per share for common stock, the exer-
 cise price on managers' options must be at least $ioo per share, or the
 options will not qualify as ISOs. But the options obviously would be
 much more valuable with a lower exercise price. Indeed, the manager
 would prefer options with a $i per share exercise price that still quali-
 fied as ISOs. She therefore would like to be able to value the common
 stock, for tax purposes, at $i per share on the grant date.71
 (b) Nonqualified Stock Options. - While a low valuation for the
 common stock helps options with a low exercise price to qualify as
 ISOs, other preconditions for ISO treatment sometimes cannot be sat-
 isfied, including size limitations and holding periods.72 If NQO status
 is unavoidable, well-advised managers can sometimes use self-help to
 mitigate the adverse consequences of this status, as long as they can
 assert a low valuation for the common stock.
 The problem with NQOs is that employees generally owe tax - at
 ordinary income rates - when they exercise the options;73 the tax is
 based on the difference between the options' exercise price and the
 fair market value when the option is exercised. See section 56(b)(3). The marginal tax rate gener-
 ally is 28%. See section 55(b)(I)(A)(i)(II) (outlining the rate for taxable excess beyond $I75,000).
 Under some circumstances, taxpayers can claim a tax credit for the amount of the AMT they have
 paid, reducing their income tax in later years. For a discussion, see Barbara J. Raasch & Judith
 L. Rowland, Stock Option Planning, 77 TAXES, Jan. i999, at 39, 4I.
 70 See section 422(b)(4). The Internal Revenue Code imposes several other preconditions as
 well, including a holding period and an annual limit on the size of the option grant. See section
 42 2(a)(I) (providing that, in order to qualify, a taxpayer must not dispose of the shares within two
 years of the date of the grant of the option or within one year after the transfer of the shares to the
 holder); section 422(d) (providing that the aggregate fair market value of the underlying shares,
 determined when the option is granted, cannot exceed $ioo,ooo per calendar year per employee).
 71 While ISOs and common stock can provide similar tax benefits to executives, at-the-money
 ISOs can also provide a financial accounting benefit. For a discussion, see infra note 82.
 72 See supra note 70.
 73 See Tleas. Reg. ? i.83-7(a). If the option has a "readily ascertainable fair market value"
 when granted, the option is taxed when it is received, and not when it is exercised. Id. Yet op-
 tions rarely satisfy this condition. For instance, an option that is not freely transferable does not
 have "readily ascertainable fair market value" within the meaning of the regulation. TIeas. Reg.
 ? i.83-7(b).
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 stock's fair market value at the time of exercise.74 In contrast, when
 the executive sells the stock, gain or loss is capital in character.75
 Compared to ISOs, then, NQOs yield income that is taxed earlier and
 at a higher rate, but only on profits earned before the option is exer-
 cised. Any profit earned after exercise is taxed like the return on ISOs
 - that is, at capital gains rates when the executive ultimately sells the
 stock. Thus, as a self-help strategy to make the tax treatment of
 NQOs approximate that of ISOs, managers can exercise the option
 early, thereby attaining deferred capital gains treatment for post-
 exercise appreciation.
 Such self-help exacts two potentially significant costs, each of
 which is mitigated by a low tax valuation for the underlying common
 stock. First, to exercise the options managers must pay the exercise
 price (or borrow it from the company). Second, exercise of the options
 triggers a current tax liability if the stock's value exceeds the exercise
 price.76 For example, assume the options' exercise price is $ioo per
 share, and the stock is worth $I50 per share when the options are ex-
 ercised. Managers must pay $ioo per share to the company, plus tax
 on the $5o-per-share profit. These problems are mitigated if the exer-
 cise price is low and the stock's fair market value is also low when the
 options are exercised. To be clear, the manager does not really want
 the stock's value to be low; rather, she wants to treat it as low for tax
 purposes. Thus, the cost to the manager is far lower if the options' ex-
 ercise price is $i per share and the common stock is valued at $i per
 share when they are exercised. Managers can achieve this result if the
 common stock is valued for tax purposes at only $i per share when the
 options are granted, and the executives exercise the options immedi-
 ately.77 To secure this tax benefit, entrepreneurs and managers some-
 times negotiate for the right to exercise options immediately, even if
 the options are not yet vested. In a "pre-exercise," as this step is some-
 times called, the executive exercises the option, but the underlying
 stock is subject to vesting. Again, the key to this self-help is a low tax
 valuation for the common stock.
 74 Treas. Reg. ? i.83-7(a). The firm has a corresponding deduction that, as noted above, typi-
 cally is unimportant in the venture capital context. See `l1eas. Reg. ? I .83-6; supra note 5 7.
 75 See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
 40.04, at 40-33 through 40-35 (3d ed. 2002); see also JOHN L. UTZ, NONSTATUTORY STOCK
 OPTIONS, at A-5 n.39 (BNA Tax Management Portfolio 383-3d, 200I).
 76 See David Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive
 Compatibility, ioo COLUM. L. REV. 440, 468-70 (2000) (discussing the economic advantages to
 executives of delaying exercise of their options).
 77 In effect, option holders are trying to duplicate the result of a section 83(b) election - a step
 that, for technical reasons, is not available for nonqualified options. See Tleas. Reg. ? i.83-2(a)
 (requiring the transfer of property within the meaning of Treas. Reg. ? i.83-3(a) as a condition of
 election); Tleas. Reg. ? i.83-3(a)(2) ("The grant of an option to purchase certain property does not
 constitute a transfer of such property."); see also Schizer, supra note 76, at 493-94.
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 B. The Impact of Convertible Preferred Stock on the Valuation of
 Common Stock
 We have seen that the tax treatment of managers' incentive com-
 pensation turns on the valuation of common stock on the grant date.
 When the manager and venture capitalist receive identical stock at
 approximately the same time, and the venture capitalist pays more, the
 tax law dictates a commonsense result: the price the venture capitalist
 pays for the common stock sets its fair market value, and the discount
 offered to the employee generally is taxed as ordinary income.78 To
 avoid this result, the tax planning goal is to drive a wedge between the
 tax valuation of the manager's equity compensation, on one hand, and
 the price the venture capitalist pays for its investment, on the other.
 This is the tax reason for giving venture capitalists convertible pre-
 ferred stock instead of common stock.79
 For tax purposes, the manager would like to value this common
 stock at $i per share, thereby avoiding current tax and allowing any
 subsequent appreciation to enjoy tax deferral and reduced rates. Yet
 what is the theory for according such a low value to the stock, given
 that the venture capitalists paid so much more for their investment?
 The practitioner's standard answer is that the venture capitalists have
 a senior security; if the firm liquidates immediately after the parties
 make their investments, the managers will receive only $i per share.
 The key to a reduced tax bill, then, is to value the common stock
 based on a hypothetical immediate liquidation in which preferred
 stockholders claim almost everything.
 To an extent, it is fair to claim that the common stock is worth less
 than the convertible preferred stock. The latter has greater control
 rights and a liquidation preference that can prove valuable in the
 zombie scenario. Yet these advantages only go so far. Indeed, if prior-
 ity in liquidation is not worth very much in early-stage high-tech ven-
 tures, as we argue in Part II, preferred stock should not be much more
 valuable than common stock. Rather, the value of the common stock
 in a capital structure with preferred stock (or any senior security) is de-
 termined largely by its option value.80 In a venture capital portfolio
 78 See Morton v. Comm'r, I997 T.C.M. (RIA) ? 97,i66, at 195, II04 ("Determining fair mar-
 ket value is often difficult where, as here, the subject property is the capital stock of a closely held
 corporation for which no public market exists. In these circumstances, an actual arm's-length sale
 of the stock in the normal course of business within a reasonable time before or after the valua-
 tion date is the best evidence of fair market value."); Culp v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 207, 2I2
 (i989) (stock was valued at the price at which the taxpayer had submitted bids for the stock in
 the over-the-counter market near the time at which he received the stock as compensation).
 79 In a thoughtful early work, William Sahlman alludes to this tax planning goal, although he
 does not develop the point. See Sahlman, supra note 5, at 5 IO.
 80 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 8i J.
 POL. ECON. 637, 638 (I973). Theoretically, another way for the government to challenge these
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 company, the common stock is effectively a long-term option with a
 high variance, so the value will be substantial - approaching the
 price the venture capitalist pays for convertible preferred stock that is
 also, to a significant extent, an option. Yet this option value is irrele-
 vant if the common stock's value, for tax purposes, is based on pro-
 ceeds that hypothetically would be received in an immediate liquida-
 tion. In other words, liquidation-based valuation is economically
 naive, to say the least.
 Despite the aggressiveness of looking to liquidation value, many
 practitioners are willing to use it.81 In their view, IRS auditors may
 not be sophisticated enough to recognize the option value inherent in
 common stock. The auditors' more sophisticated bosses may be reluc-
 tant to compel taxpayers to undertake the potentially complex and
 subjective task of computing option value. In any event, Joseph Bart-
 lett has observed that "[t]he Internal Revenue Service has never chal-
 lenged successfully the view that the issuance of shares with a liquida-
 tion preference - ordinarily labeled preferred stock - can 'eat up'
 value in an amount equal to the preference, thereby reducing the
 common stock (the 'cheap stock') to marginal value."82 Similarly, Julie
 valuations is to value the services provided in exchange for the stock. Cf Larson v. Comm'r, i988
 T.C.M. (CCH) i637, i638 ("Where property received by a taxpayer does not have a readily ascer-
 tainable fair market value, its value may be determined by reference to the fair market value of
 the consideration given for the property."). We are not aware of any effort by the federal govern-
 ment to use this valuation-of-services approach in the context of venture capital startups.
 81 There is some authority for using liquidation value, but much of this authority involves
 partnerships, not corporations. See, e.g., St. John v. United States, 84-I U.S.T.C. 9I58 (C.D. Ill.
 i983) (using liquidation value to value partnership profits interest); see also infra pp. 907-09 (dis-
 cussing treatment of partnership profits interests). Other cases involve corporations that are rea-
 sonably likely to liquidate. See, e.g., Learner v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 923, 927 (i983) (in
 measuring the value of a charitable deduction, approving the liquidation method for a taxpayer's
 minority interest, since there were reasonable prospects that the corporation would be liquidated,
 including the out-of-date nature of firm's steel-manufacturing equipment and a pending deriva-
 tive suit in which shareholders were seeking liquidation); Berckmans v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.M.
 (CCH) 458, 467 (i96i) (in measuring whether a taxpayer received compensation for services
 through bargain purchase of stock, approving the use of liquidation value because the corporation
 was inactive and unproven, and emphasizing that, although the firm might become a vehicle for
 acquiring active businesses, it might also remain an empty shell); Estate of Garrett v. Comm'r, I2
 T.C.M. (CCH) II42, II50 (I953) (using liquidation value as fair market value, for purposes of es-
 tate tax, where a logging company had long ceased to be active, its equipment was antiquated,
 and its supply of timber nearly exhausted).
 82 I JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL BUYOUTS,
 RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS 82-83 (2d ed. I995). While the IRS has chal-
 lenged such valuations in the estate tax area, see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-II9, i983-2 C.B. 57, Bartlett
 emphasizes that it required a statutory change, section 270I, for the IRS to finally shut down the
 practice. i BARTLETT, supra, at 83 n.24. Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commission
 (SEC) has begun challenging these low valuations in a different context. For financial accounting
 purposes, companies have assigned low valuations to their common stock at the time options are
 granted to managers. The goal is to keep options from being treated as in-the-money when
 granted, a precondition for minimizing compensation expense by keeping option expense out of
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 Robinson, Lee Benton, and Robert Gunderson describe this tax strat-
 egy as the primary reason for using convertible preferred stock in ven-
 ture capital structure.83
 Practitioners vary in how far they are willing to push this aggres-
 sive strategy. A low valuation is probably easier for ISOs than for
 other structures, since the statute expressly permits "good faith" valua-
 tions in determining whether options qualify as ISOS.84 Likewise, it is
 helpful for time to pass between the issuance of common stock to ex-
 ecutives and the investment by venture capitalists, so that executives
 can argue that their common stock was worth less at this earlier time
 before the company made important progress.85 Similarly, a low value
 is safer for seed and early-round financings, when the firm does not
 have a record of increased prices paid in additional financing rounds.
 A government challenge is more likely if managers buy common stock
 or receive options at a steeply discounted price shortly before a higher-
 priced IPO, though practitioners report that the IRS seldom challenges
 valuations even in this setting.86
 the body of the income statement. The SEC has begun raising this issue when reviewing IPO
 prospectuses. See William A. Hines et al., Identifying and Avoiding "Cheap Stock" Problems,
 in 2 VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION, supra note 29, at 29A-I, 29A-2
 ("In reviewing registration statements for initial public offerings, the SEC staff routinely analyzes
 whether the issuer has recorded sufficient compensation expense with respect to stock options
 .... This issue has received increasing attention from the SEC staff in recent years.").
 83 According to these authors:
 Once the decision has been made to go forward with the investment, choice of security
 and determination of price represent the venture capitalist's most fundamental deci-
 sions. Critical to the choice of security decision is usually the fact that founders and key
 employees of the Company have bought, are buying, or will buy Common Stock from
 the Company at a cheap price .... If Common Stock were to be sold to the investors at
 a price [equal to full investment value], the tax consequences to the key employees con-
 temporaneously buying Common Stock could be devastating .... As a result, it may be
 very much in the interest of the founders and key employees that the investors purchase
 senior securities that can be valued at a price higher than the Company's Common
 Stock.
 Julie M. Robinson et al., Portfolio Company Investments: Hi-Tech Corporation - Getting
 to the Term Sheet, in i VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION, supra note
 29, at 6-i, 6-7.
 84 See section 422(C)(I).
 85 LEVIN, supra note 42, ? 20I.I.2, at 2-6. Another way to depress the common stock's value
 is to impose restrictions that, by their terms, do not lapse; unlike vesting conditions, these
 "nonlapse" conditions are relevant in valuing compensation for tax purposes. Although the man-
 ager would have ordinary income if the nonlapse condition is later waived for a compensatory
 purpose, parties might seek to justify the waiver with a noncompensatory purpose, a step that
 many believe avoids this tax cost to the manager. See Matthew A. Rosen, The Many Continuing
 Uncertainties of Section 83, in 6 TAx STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
 DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &
 RESTRUCTURINGS 98i, IOI9-32 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series, Course Handbook
 Series No. J-477, 2000).
 86 According to several practitioners, the convention in Silicon Valley once was the so-called
 "ten-to-one rule," in which the executive's common stock was valued at one-tenth of the price
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 C. Summary
 In this Part we have identified the tax advantage of using converti-
 ble preferred stock. Managers report a lower tax valuation for their
 common stock, transforming current ordinary income into deferred
 capital gain. Ironically, even though the venture capitalist's preference
 is in some ways more formal than substantive, taxpayers use this form
 to claim a real substantive benefit: favorable tax treatment for the
 highly intense management incentives that are central to venture capi-
 tal contracting.87 While we assert that a significant reason for using
 convertible preferred stock is to attain this tax advantage, our argu-
 ment is less persuasive if there are better ways to pursue this tax goal.
 In the next Part, we consider likely alternatives.
 IV. ALTERNATIVE TAX STRATEGIES
 In what ways can high-tech start-up managers seek to transmute
 ordinary income into deferred capital gain? This Part explores why
 convertible preferred stock is used instead of three potential alterna-
 tives. The first two - convertible debt and a unit composed of
 straight preferred stock and common stock - would modify the busi-
 ness deal, and could also impose significant tax costs on the venture
 capitalist. The third alternative - partnership profits interests - is
 arguably more effective than convertible preferred stock at attaining
 the desired tax treatment, but presents other tax costs and is some-
 times regarded as too complex and unfamiliar.
 Moreover, while there are reasons to prefer convertible preferred
 stock ab initio, there are also significant costs in departing from mar-
 ket practice once enough firms have used this capital structure.88 For
 example, legal fees are higher. Likewise, more time and resources
 must be devoted to explaining the unique terms to all relevant parties,
 and to allaying suspicions that these terms would disadvantage some-
 one. Indeed, entrepreneurs and managers may find it reassuring for
 their venture to follow market practice, since they otherwise may fear
 that sophisticated venture capitalists are using an unconventional term
 to extract a hard-to-identify concession. In other words, standardiza-
 tion and precedent are a response to information asymmetry.
 paid by the venture capitalist for convertible preferred. This rule of thumb, which was reportedly
 based more on market practice than on a particular authority, is considered conservative by some.
 One practitioner reported that iooo-to-I valuation ratios are sometimes used. These conclusions
 are based on conversations with approximately thirty practitioners from July 200I through Au-
 gust 2002. These practitioners requested that their names and affiliations not be disclosed.
 87 As discussed below, this strategy is less useful in other contexts. See infra p. 9I3.
 88 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28, at 766-67. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra
 note 28.
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 A. The Venture Capitalist Receives Convertible Debt
 In evaluating alternatives, we must remember that the key to en-
 hancing managers' tax treatment is a low grant-date valuation for the
 common stock. Under the aggressive liquidation method of valuation
 described above,89 convertible preferred stock accomplishes this end,
 but so too would convertible debt.
 Empirical evidence suggests that parties sometimes use convertible
 debt,90 and some of the economics literature does not distinguish con-
 vertible debt from convertible preferred stock for purposes of their
 analysis.91 Even so, the use of debt instead of preferred stock changes
 the deal. Creditors have more powerful remedies in the event of de-
 fault than preferred stockholders, including the ability to force the firm
 into bankruptcy.92 Likewise, debt is higher in priority than preferred
 equity, although, as noted above, the value of this priority depends on
 expectations about assets that will be available in liquidation.93
 In addition, the use of convertible debt instead of convertible pre-
 ferred stock can increase the venture capitalist's tax bill by generating
 "phantom income" - that is, income that is taxable before any cash is
 received.94 For instance, assume that the security promises the ven-
 ture capitalist a periodic payment every year but allows the firm to de-
 fer this payment. If the security is a debt instrument, this payment is
 currently taxable as ordinary income, even if the actual receipt is de-
 layed.95 In contrast, if parties document the security as preferred stock
 89 See supra pp. 898-goo.
 90 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 50 tbl.i (reporting, in a sample of 200 rounds
 of venture capital financing, ig rounds employing at least some convertible debt, compared to I59
 rounds employing convertible preferred stock).
 91 See, e.g., HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 4 n.2 ("[Participating convertible preferred equity] is
 essentially the same as convertible debt, except that the firm is not required to make regular divi-
 dend/coupon payments."); Gompers, supra note 3, at 2 n.i ("The payoff to convertible debt and
 redeemable convertible preferred equity are essentially equivalent . .. ."); cf CORNELLI &
 YOSHA, supra note 4, at 3 ("Since our model abstracts from taxes and control rights, it would
 make little difference if we used convertible preferred equity rather than convertible debt.").
 92 Practitioners thus report that firms are reluctant to give the venture capitalist creditor
 status, if only because this step could make it more difficult to secure bank financing at a later
 stage. A bank generally prefers not to share with others the ability to force a firm into bank-
 ruptcy, because such sharing would reduce the bank's bargaining power.
 93 Moreover, this preference arises only if the convertible debt is actually respected as debt by
 the parties; this issue is a matter of some concern if interest is not paid on the debt because most
 startups experience a significant period of negative cash flow.
 94 See Peter A. Furci & David H. Schnabel, Convertible Preferred Stock Investments by Pri-
 vate Funds: A Practical Guide to Tax Structuring, in iO TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE
 ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGAN-
 IZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 200I, at 9g9, 927 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series,
 Course Handbook Series No. J-5I3, 200I) [hereinafter TAX STRATEGIES] (defining phantom in-
 come and noting that investorsos in private funds tend to be very unhappy" when they receive it).
 95 This result arises from the original issue discount (OD) rules, which generally require in-
 vestors in certain securities to accrue interest income before receiving any cash. See generally sec-
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 and structure the transaction with care, they should owe no tax unless
 and until the security actually makes a payment.96 A second tax ad-
 tion I272. This regime generally applies to bonds that are issued for less than they will pay at
 maturity, as well as to bonds on which periodic payments may be deferred at the issuer's discre-
 tion. See section I273(a) (defining OID as the excess of the stated redemption price at maturity
 over the issue price); Treas. Reg. ? I.I273-i(b) (stated redemption price at maturity includes all
 payments other than "qualified stated interest"); id. ? I.1273-I(c)(I)(i) (noting that interest is not
 qualified stated interest unless it is "unconditionally payable").
 A creative advisor might be able to avoid this phantom income by structuring the debt se-
 curity so that it never makes a periodic payment under any circumstances and is not issued at a
 discount. In other words, the venture capitalist's only compensation would come from the right
 to convert the bond into common stock. Technically, the bond would no longer be a discount
 bond (since the redemption price is equal to the issue price, assuming the bond is not converted).
 Yet there is some risk of phantom income under the "contingent debt" regulations. See Treas.
 Reg. ? I.I275-4. While this regime generally does not apply to traditional convertible bonds, see
 id. ? I.I275-4(a)(4), some practitioners worry that nontraditional convertible bonds, such as those
 with no coupon or discount, could still be covered by the contingent debt regime or, alternatively,
 could be bifurcated into a warrant and a discount bond. See id. ? I.I275-2(g)(I)-(2) (setting forth
 the anti-abuse rule that provides for bifurcated treatment of a contingent debt instrument); Treas.
 Reg. ? I.I275-2(g)(3) (noting that the anti-abuse rule declines to recharacterize convertible debt,
 but convertible debt in the example provides for annual payments of interest); Rev. Rul. 2002-3I,
 2002-22 I.R.B. I023, I026 (treating contingent convertible bonds as governed by the contingent
 debt regulations).
 96 In fact, an important planning goal in these transactions is to keep the convertible preferred
 stock from throwing off phantom income. The key is to avoid triggering section 305, which im-
 putes phantom income on preferred stock in certain circumstances. See generally Furci & Schna-
 bel, supra note 94, at 93I-45 (discussing the imputation of income under section 305 and various
 strategies used to avoid this result); Glen Kohl et al., Selected Issues Involving Preferred Stock
 and Section 305, in io TAX STRATEGIES, supra note 94, at 757 (discussing the treatment of pre-
 ferred stock under section 305). Although the nuances of this planning are beyond this Article's
 scope, three points should be mentioned briefly. First, section 305 does not apply if the stock
 participates[] in corporate growth to any significant extent." Treas. Reg. ? I.305-5(a). Oddly, for
 this purpose, the fact that a security is convertible does not help. See id. ("The determination of
 whether stock is preferred for purposes of section 305 shall be made without regard to any right to
 convert such stock . . . ."). Some practitioners are comfortable, however, with similar economic
 terms that are thought, technically, not to qualify as a "conversion" right. For instance, the inves-
 tor might receive a claim in liquidation equal to the greater of the liquidation preference or the
 amount a common shareholder claims. A more conservative fix is to use so-called "participating"
 preferred stock, which, as discussed above, allows a holder to share in dividends and liquidations
 as both a preferred and a common shareholder. See Furci & Schnabel, supra note 94, at 934-35;
 see also 2 MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, AcQUISITIONS, AND
 BUYOUTS ? I302.3.I (200I) (discussing the use of participating preferred securities to avoid phan-
 tom income under section 305).
 Second, assuming that parties do not use participating preferred stock, a standard source of
 phantom income is a redemption premium. See Treas. Reg. ? I.305-5(b)(I) (providing for the ac-
 crual of income if the price the issuer pays in redeeming the preferred stock exceeds, by a suffi-
 ciently large margin, the price investors initially paid to buy the stock). To avoid this result, pre-
 ferred stock is often structured to include a periodic dividend payment instead of a redemption
 premium. With this tweak, taxpayers often take the position that there is no phantom income
 when these periodic payments are delayed, even though such deferral effectively turns the peri-
 odic payments into a redemption premium. See Furci & Schnabel, supra note 94, at 940-43 (de-
 scribing this technique as a common strategy for avoiding phantom income but cautioning that
 legislative history suggests that the IRS has regulatory authority to find phantom income if the
 issuer has no intention of paying dividends currently). This claim is aggressive for venture capital
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 vantage of convertible preferred stock over debt is that stock can be
 eligible for a special reduced tax rate for small businesses under Sec-
 tion I202.97 Another modest tax advantage of convertible preferred
 stock is that, in the unlikely event that the stock actually pays divi-
 dends, venture capitalists that are corporations can claim the divi-
 dends-received deduction - a tax benefit that would not be available
 if the security were structured as debt.98 A countervailing tax consid-
 eration is that convertible debt affords the portfolio company a deduc-
 tion for interest expense, while convertible preferred stock does not.99
 Yet deductions are of limited value to a portfolio company that is
 likely to accumulate net operating losses over its early years of opera-
 tion.100 Therefore, the economic characteristics of a financing transac-
 tion involving convertible debt, and its tax consequences for venture
 capitalists, are sufficiently disadvantageous to make convertible debt
 financing a generally inferior method of obtaining the tax advantage of
 convertible preferred stock.
 startups because investors generally do not expect companies to pay dividends while the preferred
 stock is outstanding. See Benton et al., supra note 29, at 8-8.
 Finally, phantom income is less of a concern if the firm has no earnings and profits (E&P)
 - as is initially the case with most startups - since dividends (whether phantom or actual) are
 taxable as ordinary income only to the extent of E&P. See sections 30I(c), 3i6(a). Yet "many in-
 vestors are understandably reluctant to rely" on the absence of E&P because of quirks in its com-
 putation. Furci & Schnabel, supra note 94, at 930-3I (noting that a company can have E&P in
 any year that it is profitable, even though losses from prior years dwarf this current E&P).
 97 The taxpayer must satisfy a five-year holding period to claim section I202's reduced rate.
 With convertible debt, the time before the bond is converted does not count. But with convertible
 preferred stock, the holding period includes the time prior to conversion. LEVIN, supra note 42,
 ? go6.i, at 9-2I. In addition, with convertible debt only post-conversion gain is eligible for the
 special rate, whereas with convertible preferred stock the entire gain is eligible. Id.
 98 See section 243 (permitting a corporate recipient of a dividend to deduct either 70%, 8o%,
 or ioo% of the amount of the dividend, depending upon the extent of the taxpayer's ownership in
 the firm). While venture capital firms are generally structured as partnerships, any partners that
 are corporations could claim the dividends-received deduction for their share of the dividend.
 99 See section i63 (authorizing deductions for interest expense).
 100 See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 5I STAN. L. REV. 289, 293-94
 (i999); see also supra note 57. However, another advantage of debt, noted by Jack Levin, is that
 redemption of the debt should be treated as tax-free return of capital. Redemption of preferred
 stock, in contrast, is taxed as a dividend in some circumstances. See LEVIN, supra note 42,
 ? 603.8, at 6-3 to 6-24; see also infra note I04. Still another advantage of debt is that, if the inves-
 tor is foreign, dividends are often subject to withholding tax while interest typically is not. See
 section 87i(h) (sparing certain interest payments to foreign individuals from withholding tax); sec-
 tion 88i(c) (same for foreign corporations). This consideration should be relatively unimportant in
 high-tech startups, though, because the security is unlikely to yield any dividends before being
 converted.
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 B. The Venture Capitalist Receives a Unit Composed of Straight
 Preferred Stock and Common Stock
 A second alternative to convertible preferred stock is to give the
 venture capitalist a unit comprising two securities: straight preferred
 stock and common stock. The common stock permits the venture
 capitalist to share in the gains of success, while the preferred stock
 permits the parties to report an allocation of most of the venture capi-
 talist's investment to it, enabling the entrepreneur to claim a low value
 for her common stock and the ensuing tax benefits.10' For instance,
 assume a venture capitalist invests $i million in an enterprise. The
 parties structure the transaction so that the venture capitalist formally
 pays $990,000 for 99oo shares of preferred stock with a corresponding
 liquidation preference (ioo% of the outstanding preferred), and
 $io,ooo for io,ooo shares of common stock (50% of the outstanding
 common). At the same time, the managers pay $io,ooo for io,ooo
 shares of common stock (50% of the outstanding common). As with
 convertible preferred stock, the managers can make the (aggressive)
 argument that the common stock's value is low - $i per share - be-
 cause of the preferred stock's priority.
 Two factors suggest why this preferred-common unit is less popular
 than pure convertible preferred stock.102 First, the unit changes the
 transaction by giving the venture capitalist a more favorable deal.
 With typical convertible preferred stock, the venture capitalist must
 choose between having preferred and having common, but cannot
 make claims on both simultaneously. In the example in which the
 venture capitalist invests $i million for preferred stock that is con-
 vertible into io,ooo common shares, if the firm is being acquired for $4
 million, the venture capitalist can either convert to common and claim
 $2 million (half the sale proceeds, as owner of fifty percent of the
 common) or keep the shares' preferred status and collect only $i mil-
 lion (the liquidation preference). But with a unit, the venture capital-
 ist can assert both claims at the same time - as both a preferred and
 a common shareholder. Thus, the venture capitalist can claim
 $990,000 of the acquisition proceeds through the preferred stock while
 claiming half of what remains - 50% of $3,010,000, or $i,505,000 -
 through the common. With a total of approximately $2.5 million, the
 101 After showing that an entrepreneur would have significant ordinary income if she and the
 venture capitalists all received common stock, see LEVIN, supra note 42, ? 20I.i.i, at 2-4 to 2-5;
 see also supra pp. 893-94, Jack Levin offers this preferred-common unit as a solution to this prob-
 lem, see LEVIN, supra note 42, ? 202.2, at 2-i0. He also discusses convertible preferred stock in
 connection with this issue. See id. ?? 203.I-203.2, at 2-20 to 2-22.
 102 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 49-50 tbl.i (reporting that I.5% of the fi-
 nancing rounds in their sample involved preferred-common units, with either convertible or
 straight preferred stock, while 94.5% involved convertible preferred stock alone).
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 preferred-common unit yields $500,000 more than convertible pre-
 ferred stock would yield alone.103 Entrepreneurs typically would pre-
 fer not to give venture capitalists such a lucrative deal.
 Second, even if venture capitalists can negotiate the more generous
 deal - a plausible outcome as market conditions have dramatically
 enhanced their bargaining power - the unit creates tax problems for
 them. For instance, in some cases in which venture capitalists sell
 their preferred stock, all of the sale proceeds could be treated as a
 dividend.104 In the previous example, if the venture capitalist sold the
 preferred stock for $990,000, this entire amount could be taxed as or-
 dinary income (to the extent of the portfolio company's earnings and
 profits), with no reduction for basis.105 One way to avoid this tax
 problem is to use a "participating preferred" security that mimics the
 business terms of a preferred-common unit, but is convertible in form.
 Although documented as a single security, participating preferred stock
 entitles the venture capitalist in a liquidation or acquisition to recover
 the security's face value and then to share in any profits as if it also
 held a share of common stock.106 While the security is economically
 103 Obviously, this economic difference is relatively insignificant if the firm fails. As discussed
 above, the failed firm is unlikely to have sufficient assets in liquidation to pay the preferred liqui-
 dation preference, let alone to pay anything to common stockholders. See supra pp. 883-84.
 104 If the venture capitalist sells the preferred stock back to the firm (for example, pursuant to a
 mandatory redemption provision), this sale could be treated as a dividend under section 302 if the
 venture capitalist keeps the common stock, because the venture capitalist's percentage ownership
 might not decline sufficiently through the redemption. This problem is more significant if the
 venture capitalist has a majority stake. See LEVIN, supra note 42, ? 603.8, at 6-23 to 6-24. One
 "fix" would be to require the common stock to be redeemed whenever the preferred stock is re-
 deemed. In any event, as noted above, dividends are taxed as ordinary income only to the extent
 that the firm has E&P - something that, in a new venture, typically will not happen for a num-
 ber of years, although there may be E&P by the time the venture capitalist sells the stock. See
 supra note 96.
 105 Another problem is that, theoretically, the venture capitalist could have phantom income
 under this structure. The IRS might challenge the allocation of purchase price, asserting that the
 actual issue price of the preferred stock was less than its $99o,ooo redemption price - notwith-
 standing the parties' reported allocation of the investment between preferred and common stock
 - because the common stock was worth more than $io,ooo. If the IRS challenges the valuation
 in this way, the preferred stock would have a redemption premium and thus could have phantom
 income. See Treas. Reg. ? I.305-5(b). For a discussion, see 2 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 96,
 ? I302.3.I(2), at I3-22. Obviously, this issue can arise only if the government challenges the par-
 ties' low valuation of the common stock - a scenario that many consider unlikely, as discussed
 supra section III.B. In any event, this risk of phantom income disappears if the parties use par-
 ticipating preferred stock; with a single security instead of a unit, they would not need to allocate
 the purchase price (that is, between common and preferred stock). Cf. 2 GINSBURG & LEVIN,
 supra note 96, ? I302.3.I(4), at I3-23 to I3-24 (noting that constructive distribution rules generally
 do not apply to participating preferred stock).
 106 See 2 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 96, ? I302.3.I(4), at I3-24 (describing how converti-
 ble preferred stock can be given "substantial participation features").
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 comparable to a unit, it is formally different and, for technical reasons,
 less likely to saddle the venture capitalist with ordinary income. 107
 In sum, although a preferred-common unit offers managers as
 strong a tax argument as traditional convertible securities, this struc-
 ture changes the business deal and introduces a potential tax cost for
 the venture capitalist. If the parties actually prefer this revised busi-
 ness deal, they will use an alternative - participating preferred stock
 - that is less likely to saddle the venture capitalist with a new tax
 cost.
 C. The Use of Partnership Structure and the Grant of Profits Interests
 to Managers
 The alternatives to convertible preferred stock canvassed so far de-
 pend, like classic convertible preferred stock itself, on an aggressive
 valuation. To establish that their common stock is not valuable, the
 managers claim that the venture capitalist's preferences are very valu-
 able. In this respect, taxpayers are relying on the IRS's willingness to
 ignore the common stock's option value. In contrast, a final alterna-
 tive avoids aggressive and uneconomic valuations, relying instead on a
 favorable principle of partnership tax law.
 Under straightforward rules of partnership tax, a partner is not
 currently taxed upon receiving a "profits interest" in the partnership in
 return for performing or promising to perform services. These inter-
 ests provide a share only of income that the partnership earns after the
 taxpayer becomes a partner. Unlike a "capital interest," a profits inter-
 est yields nothing if the partnership liquidates and distributes prior
 earnings on the day that the taxpayer becomes a partner. As a result,
 tax law treats the partner, in effect, as receiving nothing when she ac-
 quires the partnership interest. This is an economically questionable
 conclusion, because the profits interest may have considerable value.108
 Even so, the partner is not taxed until she begins sharing the partner-
 ship's earnings. 109
 107 Because the "preferred" component of this security is inseparable from the "common" com-
 ponent, venture capitalists are never in the position of selling the preferred stock by itself. Hence,
 they can never be subject to section 302, which, as noted above, can impose adverse consequences
 on this step. See supra note Io4; see also supra note 96 (discussing other tax advantages to ven-
 ture capitalists of participating preferred stock).
 108 Just ask a new partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore whether making partner, and gaining
 the continued right to use the firm's reputation and assets, affects her net worth.
 109 The details and history of this rule are beyond this Article's scope. In general, a widely fol-
 lowed judicial decision seemed to suggest that profits interests would have to be valued and taxed
 when received. See Diamond v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 530, 544-47 (I97i), affd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.
 I974). But cf Campbell v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 8I5, 823 (8th Cir. iggi) ("[W]e doubt that the tax
 court correctly held that Campbell's profits interests were taxable upon receipt."). The tax bar
 responded with a wave of criticism that focused on difficulties in administering this rule. In re-
This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Wed, 01 Jun 2016 04:32:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 908 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. Ii6:874
 Armed with this deferral rule for profits interests, managers can
 ensure that their compensation is taxed on a deferred basis at long-
 term capital gains rates, with no risk of a valuation challenge by the
 IRS.110 As an example, assume that a portfolio company is organized
 as a partnership, instead of as a corporation. The managers receive
 profits interests when they begin employment, while the venture capi-
 talist holds a capital interest in return for cash contributions. The par-
 ties can allocate voting and governance rights any way that they de-
 sire, thereby allowing the separation of control rights and cash flow
 rights that is central to venture capital contracting. The critical fea-
 ture, of course, is a "preference" for the venture capitalist's capital in-
 terest: if the partnership were to liquidate immediately after the man-
 agers received their profits interests, the venture capitalist would have
 to receive all the assets.111 As long as the transaction satisfies the for-
 malities of Revenue Procedure 93-27, managers will not have any or-
 dinary income upon receiving the profits interest.112 Sale of the profits
 interest generally yields capital gain. Profits earned before the man-
 ager sells the interest are taxed as ordinary income, but such income
 rarely arises in early-stage startups.113
 In short, the partnership alternative offers essentially the same tax
 benefits as the convertible preferred stock strategy: replacing current
 ordinary income with deferred capital gain. Indeed, the partnership
 sponse, the government issued Rev. Proc. 93-27, I993-2 C.B. 343, which exempts profits interests
 from current tax as long as the interests satisfy specified requirements. See id. at 344.
 110 See Michael J. Halloran et al., Agreement of Limited Partnership, in i VENTURE CAPITAL
 & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION i-i, I-50 (Michael J. Halloran et al. eds., 3d ed. Supp.
 I999).
 111 See Rev. Proc. 200I-43, 200I-34 I.R.B. ioi (providing that the relevant date for determining
 whether a partnership interest is a profits interest is the grant date, even if the interest is substan-
 tially nonvested at the time of grant).
 112 See Rev. Proc. 93-27, I993-2 C.B. 343. The Revenue Procedure provides that its favorable
 tax treatment is not available if the profits interest relates to a substantially certain stream of in-
 come, if the partner sells the profits interest within two years, or if the partnership is publicly
 traded within the meaning of section 7704(b). Id.
 113 To shelter the manager from this ordinary income, the parties can organize the venture as a
 corporation, while "wrapping" the corporation in a partnership. In other words, the manager and
 venture capitalist own a partnership (with profits and capital interests, respectively), and the
 partnership owns stock in a corporation that holds the venture's assets. With this structure, the
 manager's profit interest yields only capital gain when the partnership sells the portfolio com-
 pany's stock in an IPO. One vulnerability of this arrangement, though, is that the partnership
 seems to serve no purpose - other than allowing managers access to the tax rule for profits inter-
 ests - and thus the government might disregard it for tax purposes. A further vulnerability is
 that the manager may be deemed to have received the profits interest in a capacity other than as
 partner. Even assuming the structure is respected, moreover, it does not avoid the tax on ordinary
 income, but merely shifts the burden from the manager to the corporation, which is still taxed on
 this ordinary income. As noted above, strategies that generate capital gain for the manager typi-
 cally impose an offsetting tax cost on the firm and are most sensible when the firm is in a low tax
 bracket. See supra note 57.
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 strategy is especially effective because it is based on a formal IRS posi-
 tion rather than on unstated practice.
 This immunity from valuation-based challenges is a reason to or-
 ganize startups as partnerships (or, specifically, as limited-liability
 companies that are taxed as partnerships). An additional tax benefit
 that Professor Joseph Bankman emphasizes is the potential for part-
 ners to deduct startup losses. Yet although startups sometimes use this
 form, it is not the "standard" structure for startups, for reasons Bank-
 man describes.114 For instance, the partnership form can complicate
 the tax positions of foreign and tax-exempt investors.115 Additionally,
 partnerships are ineligible for certain tax benefits otherwise available
 to startups.116 Partnerships also involve complicated tax reporting on
 K-i forms, which are unfamiliar and potentially confusing to many en-
 trepreneurs. In contrast, the convertible preferred approach is ac-
 cepted and understood: for reasons that suggest path dependence,117 it
 would be costly for the venture capitalist to investigate an alternative
 structure and explain it to entrepreneurs and portfolio company em-
 ployees.
 V. VALUATION RULES AS A SUBSIDY
 While our primary purpose in this Article is positive, explaining the
 tax reason for using convertible preferred stock in U.S. venture capital
 structure, it is also important to examine this tax planning normatively
 by asking what goals it promotes. If the policy goal is to conform the
 treatment of high-tech startup employees (who are now receiving de-
 ferred capital gain) with the tax treatment of other employees (who re-
 ceive immediately taxable ordinary income), then the tax authorities
 should crack down on this planning by challenging the managers' ag-
 gressive and economically naive valuations.118
 114 See Bankman, supra note 9, at I74I-47; see also Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuber-
 ance of Venture Capital Startups (2002) (working paper, on file with the Harvard Law School
 Library). Still another advantage of a partnership is that it is easier to sell part of the business
 without triggering entity-level gain. In contrast, a startup organized as a corporation would have
 difficulty avoiding corporate-level gain upon selling a portion of its assets. See section 3Ii(b).
 For instance, a spinoff followed by a tax-free acquisition triggers an entity level tax. See section
 355(e). We are indebted to Andrew Berg for this point.
 115 If the startup generates "unrelated business taxable income" and "effectively connected in-
 come," this income will flow through directly to tax-exempt and foreign investors in the venture
 capital fund, causing them to owe taxes and to file returns. See Fleischer, supra note I I4.
 116 For instance, a fifty percent exclusion for gains from certain "qualified small business stock"
 is available only for C corporation stock. See section I202(c). Likewise, an investment in one
 startup sometimes can be replaced, tax-free, with an investment in another startup, but again, this
 "rollover" is available only for stock in a C corporation. See section I045.
 117 See generally Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28.
 118 Conventional reasons to pursue such parity include horizontal equity (so that executives
 who earn the same amount pay the same tax) and efficiency (so that executives who otherwise
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 But what if the government's goal, instead, is to promote high-tech
 startups? We take no position here about the wisdom of this goal,119
 but assuming that the government wishes to commit resources to pro-
 moting high-tech startups, economically inaccurate valuations may
 serve a useful purpose.120 Specifically, the government's tolerance of
 aggressively low valuations might be understood as a form of tax sub-
 sidy for high-tech startups, targeted at a critical feature of the venture
 capital contracting process: the high-intensity performance incentives
 provided to managers of early-stage companies. The IRS allows a
 substantial portion of a high-tech startup manager's compensation -
 in effect, wages for services - to be taxed as capital gain, instead of as
 ordinary income.121
 prefer to work for established firms are not lured, by tax considerations, to work at high-tech
 startups).
 119 There is a growing literature on the desirability of government efforts to promote high-tech
 startups and on the various tax and other measures that might achieve this goal. These measures
 include changing the tax rate structure and the treatment of net operating losses. These interest-
 ing issues, however, are beyond this Article's scope. For a discussion of these issues, see
 BRONWYN H. HALL, THE FINANCING OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Nat'l Bureau of
 Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8773, 2002) (recommending further study of governmental
 seed capital and subsidy programs to remedy funding gaps for research and development);
 Rosanne Altshuler & Alan J. Auerbach, The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical
 Investigation, I05 Q.J. ECON. 6I, 70-75 (I990) (discussing the effect of loss limitations on risky
 activity); Robert Caroll et al., Entrepreneurs, Income Taxes, and Investment, in DOES ATLAS
 SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 427 (Joel B. Slemrod ed.,
 2000) (finding that high marginal tax rates discourage entrepreneurs from making new invest-
 ments in their businesses); William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax Policy and Entrepreneu-
 rial Entry, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 283 (2000) (finding that a flatter rate structure encourages entre-
 preneurship); Roger H. Gordon, Can High Personal Tax Rates Encourage Entrepreneurial
 Activity?, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 49 (i998) (noting the positive externalities associated with in-
 novative entrepreneurship and arguing that disparities between corporate and individual income
 taxes encourage entrepreneurship); and James Poterba, Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxa-
 tion, in 3 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 47, 48-56 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., i989) (argu-
 ing that reductions in the capital gains rate can increase the level of venture capital activity by
 encouraging entrepreneurs to join startups).
 120 Cf generally David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549 (i998) (not-
 ing that another economically inaccurate regime, the realization rule, can be viewed as a subsidy
 with the appealing attribute of credibility).
 121 While wages are generally taxed as ordinary income, the exception we describe is one of at
 least three available to entrepreneurs. Capital gain treatment is also available to entrepreneurs
 who can characterize their contribution as property, instead of services, although this should be a
 relatively small group in the high-tech context. See supra note 55. Likewise, capital gains are
 available to entrepreneurs who do not seek outside equity financing. In return for a modest cash
 contribution, they can purchase ioo% of the firm's stock. Thereafter, they can pay themselves a
 modest salary while earning most of their return through stock appreciation. Again, though, this
 simple strategy is difficult to use in high-tech startups: given the negative cash flows associated
 with early-stage high-tech companies, they usually need substantial outside financing to grow a
 business. In a sense, the planning strategy described in this Article levels the playing field for
 high-tech startups, allowing them a tax benefit that already is available to the more limited set of
 firms using the property-contribution and internal-financing strategies.
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 We doubt that the IRS intends to subsidize venture capital in this
 way. 22 Instead, it is likely that unsophisticated auditing and adminis-
 trability concerns have spawned the government's tolerance of aggres-
 sive valuations. Yet the venture capital community has become accus-
 tomed to this tax benefit - recall Joseph Bartlett's colorful reference
 to "eat-em-up" convertible preferred stock123 - and can be expected to
 employ its political muscle to protect the implicit subsidy if the IRS
 begins challenging liquidation-based valuations.124 Thus, however it
 began, the practice now functions as a tax subsidy.125
 Despite its unintentional origins, the practice has several appealing
 characteristics when evaluated as a subsidy. First, for a manager to
 claim this tax benefit, private investors must first determine that the
 manager's project warrants their participation. Specifically, a private
 investor must purchase a senior security in order for a low valuation of
 122 Of course, other related venture capital tax subsidies are intentional. See, e.g., section I202
 (offering special reduced tax rate for certain small business stock); section I045 (providing a roll-
 over for small business stock); see also David A. Guenther & Michael Willenborg, Capital Gains
 Tax Rates and the Cost of Capitalfor Small Businesses: Evidence from the IPO Market, 53 J. FIN.
 ECON. 385, 396-403 (i999) (finding empirical evidence that section I202 reduces the cost of capi-
 tal for qualifying small businesses).
 123 See I BARTLETT, supra note 82, at 82-83.
 124 In an analogous circumstance, Silicon Valley mobilized to prevent the Financial Accounting
 Standards Board (FASB) from adopting a more sophisticated approach to financial accounting for
 stock options, in which the option value of grants would have been expensed. See, e.g., Stock Op-
 tions Charade: High Cost Gets Buried in the Footnotes, Bloomberg News, Mar. I4, 2000, LEXIS,
 Nexis News Library, Bloomberg News File. FASB compromised by allowing the option expense
 to be placed in footnotes instead of in the body of the income statement. FASB feared congres-
 sional intervention after "Silicon Valley workers staged a protest. FASB was bombarded with
 almost I,800 letters denouncing the idea - one of the biggest responses it had ever received for a
 proposed accounting change. Congress called for hearings." Id.; see also Mark Schwanhausser,
 Accounting-Rule Debate Has Shifted to Overseas: Change in Options Would Trim Profits,
 SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 200i, at C5, LEXIS, Nexis News Library, Seattle Times File. "Flexing
 its political muscle like never before, the high-tech community turned the U.S. board into a four-
 letter word on the streets of Silicon Valley. When the board held hearings in the valley in I994,
 3,000 workers rallied in 'Stop FASB' T-shirts." Id. The issue arose again in 2002 after a series of
 financial scandals, but again the accounting rules went unchanged (though some firms voluntarily
 began expensing options). See Karen Talley, Expensing Options Will Affect Small-Cap Firms,
 WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2002, at C8 (noting Standard & Poor's report that seventy-six companies
 have announced an intention to expense stock options).
 125 In describing this tax reduction as a "subsidy," our baseline is current law's treatment of
 wage income. Thus, the tax burden on services provided to high-tech startups (deferred tax at
 capital gains rates) is a departure from the tax burden generally imposed on wages (current tax at
 ordinary rates). Of course, it is possible to redefine the baseline so that the tax rule discussed here
 would no longer seem like a subsidy because it would no longer constitute a divergence from the
 general rule. If instead the baseline is the law's treatment of entrepreneurship, then the departure
 that this Article emphasizes is less clear since, as noted above, capital gain is available in other
 contexts as well. See supra note I 2I. In theory, we could change our normative baseline even
 more drastically. For example, tax deferral would be the norm under certain types of consump-
 tion taxes as long as wages have not yet been spent. Yet such inquiries are beyond this Article's
 scope, since we do not undertake here to determine the normatively correct tax treatment of
 entrepreneurship in a world with a perfect tax base.
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 the common stock to be offered. Thus, the government commits re-
 sources (in the form of a tax reduction for the managers) only if private
 investors are also willing to do so. In the paradigm case, these private
 investors are sophisticated venture capitalists, who have the expertise
 to identify and nurture promising projects, who prove their commit-
 ment to the ventures by investing their own funds, and who are moti-
 vated by performance-based pay and reputational concerns associated
 with the success of the venture capital funds they operate. 126 As a re-
 sult, the government can "piggyback" on the judgments of sophisti-
 cated private parties.127 In effect, the government becomes a passive
 investor in any positive externalities thrown off by a vigorous venture
 capital market, such as technological advances.
 This subsidy thus lets the government avoid either selecting for it-
 self which companies are sufficiently promising to merit direct subsi-
 dies or blindly providing the subsidy to all projects without the benefit
 of any quality screening. If it chose the projects itself, the government
 would be undertaking the role of venture capitalist without the skills
 or incentive structure that have developed in the private sector.128
 Government decisionmakers might also be subject to lobbying and
 other political influences.129 In addition, the government cannot offer
 the contributions, aside from money, that venture capitalists make to
 startups: the venture capitalist also acts as reputational intermediary,
 management consultant, and performance monitor.130 With the sub-
 sidy described in this Article, however, the provision of these services
 by a venture capitalist is a functional precondition to favorable tax
 treatment. 131
 126 Gilson, supra note 20, at I5-28.
 127 The venture capitalist's relationship to the government here is like the "branding" role that
 venture capitalists are known to play with suppliers, customers, and institutional investors. If the
 venture capitalist takes a venture seriously enough to back it financially, others will take the ven-
 ture seriously too. See Black & Gilson, supra note 26, at 254 (noting that involvement of venture
 capitalists reassures suppliers and customers); Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, Venture Capital
 and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence, 57 J. FIN. i69, I76-8I (2002)
 (discussing the contributions of venture capitalists to a portfolio company's business).
 128 Ralf Becker and Thomas Hellmann have provided an instructive account of the failure of a
 German governmental effort to provide a direct subsidy to early-stage technology. RALF
 BECKER & THOMAS HELLMANN, THE GENESIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL: LESSONS FROM
 THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE (Graduate School of Business, Stanford Univ., Working Paper No.
 I705, 2000). Cf generally James M. Poterba, Capital Gains Tax Policy Toward Entrepreneurship,
 42 NAT'L TAX J. 375 (i989) (finding that the Small Business Innovation Research Program, a
 direct-grant program implemented in the United States, served a useful certification function, but
 produced inconsistent results across regions and industries).
 129 See Gilson, supra note 20, at 47.
 130 Black & Gilson, supra note 26, at 253-55.
 131 As noted above, there are other ways of attaining capital gains treatment that do not in-
 volve venture capitalists and senior securities, such as characterizing the entrepreneur's contribu-
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 A further advantage is this subsidy's narrow scope. While this
 strategy benefits risky startups - and, indeed, is especially vital in the
 venture capital context because incentive compensation is so important
 - it is not readily transplanted to mature firms. To claim this tax
 benefit, a firm must possess a number of characteristics. First, it must
 not be currently profitable, so that the loss of compensation deductions
 will not be a problem.132 Second, the firm must have a significant po-
 tential for profit, so that employees will be enthusiastic about option-
 like equity compensation. Third, the compensation must be difficult to
 value currently, so that an aggressive tax valuation can be taken with
 a straight face; yet the compensation must also not be difficult to value
 in the future, so that executives can eventually become liquid. Finally,
 the firm must be risky. The tax benefit, after all, aims to enable man-
 agers to avoid ordinary income tax on the "option" value of the com-
 mon stock. The riskier the firm, the greater this option value will be.
 High-tech startups obviously satisfy all of these conditions, but other
 firms typically do not.133
 Ease of administration is another favorable characteristic of this
 self-executing subsidy. This sort of subsidy largely avoids two com-
 mon costs of tax expenditures: adding complexity to the tax system
 and distorting taxpayer behavior. The relevant tax rules here are easy
 to administer. The subsidy depends on the IRS's reluctance to chal-
 lenge low valuations of common stock. Ironically, it could prove more
 administratively costly to eliminate the subsidy by constantly litigating
 valuation. Indeed, the tax authorities, in tolerating the current prac-
 tice, presumably have been more interested in administrability than in
 subsidizing high-tech startups. By analogy, administrability was cer-
 tainly the reason for the favorable tax treatment of partnership profits
 interests. The government presumably did not intend to subsidize ac-
 tivity carried out in the partnership form (nor did it believe that the
 option value was zero). Additionally, it is not especially onerous, from
 the taxpayer's perspective, to claim the tax benefit in the venture capi-
 tal context: the key is to use both common and convertible preferred
 securities. While this tiered capital structure may not suit everyone,
 tion as property or not seeking outside equity financing, but these strategies are generally unsuit-
 able for high-tech startups. See supra note I 2 I.
 132 As noted above, the manager's tax strategy has an offsetting tax cost to the firm: reducing
 the firm's deductions for compensation expense. See supra note 57. While a profitable firm
 would regret losing these deductions, an unprofitable firm has less need for them.
 133 The narrowness of this measure's scope is not easy to duplicate. For instance, it would be
 difficult to draft a statutory test for determining whether a firm is risky. See Poterba, supra note
 I28, at 383-84.
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 there are obviously nontax reasons to use it, including the incentive,
 signaling, and control rationales discussed above.134
 A final characteristic of this self-executing subsidy is that, in setting
 the subsidy's size, it substitutes the market for the congressional budg-
 eting process. The venture capital market is cyclical, as the current
 downturn demonstrates. Thus, the efficient size of the subsidy de-
 pends on the presence of promising new technologies to finance, which
 will change based on the fits and starts of scientific progress. Congres-
 sional budgeting necessarily lags behind the market's evaluation of the
 level of attractive financing opportunities because of the government's
 lack of expertise and the inevitable delay associated with the political
 process. A self-executing subsidy automatically keyed to the level of
 venture capital financing constantly adjusts to the market's assessment
 of the level of viable projects.
 Of course, these significant advantages must be balanced against
 potential disadvantages, although we believe that the disadvantages
 generally are manageable, assuming a subsidy is desired. First, there
 are the familiar disadvantages of relying on tax rules instead of on di-
 rect government expenditures.135 As with any tax expenditure, this
 subsidy may be hard for the political process to monitor. In addition,
 while it is easy to cap a direct grant, capping is more difficult here be-
 cause it requires a limit on the amount of option value that could be
 spared from immediate taxation.136 Nevertheless, the venture capital-
 ist's self-interest limits the amount of equity the entrepreneur receives
 and, as noted above, the fact that the overall subsidy's size shifts with
 the level of venture capital funding is an advantage.
 A further concern is that taxpayers must take aggressive positions
 to claim the subsidy. Thus, aggressive taxpayers fare better than con-
 servative ones. Not only is this disparity inequitable, but it also can
 have unfortunate incentive effects. When the government fails to re-
 spond to aggressive tax planning in one context, aggressiveness is
 likely to increase in other contexts as well, undermining the culture of
 134 If it is onerous to use this capital structure, the subsidy theoretically could be improved by
 making it more broadly available (in an all-common capital structure, for example). Yet there is a
 risk that the subsidy would become too widely available (to mature industries as well as startups,
 for example). An advantage of the current subsidy, as noted above, is relatively narrow tailoring.
 See supra p. 9I3.
 135 See supra note I3.
 136 Another potential disadvantage is that this subsidy does not allow the government to favor
 first-time or low-income entrepreneurs and managers. The subsidy here has the opposite effect:
 high-bracket taxpayers benefit the most from transforming ordinary income into capital gain, and
 social policy concerns are unlikely to influence venture capitalists' selection of projects. Yet if the
 goal is efficiency instead of equity, it is appropriate to target ventures that have earned the confi-
 dence of professional investors and use other programs to pursue distributional goals.
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 voluntary compliance.137 Yet the government can address this concern
 in more than one way. While the obvious response is to challenge ag-
 gressive valuations, an alternative is to issue a notice accepting them
 as a matter of law. As with partnership profits interests, the liquida-
 tion method can be expressly approved in this context. Through a no-
 tice, conservative taxpayers will be free to claim the tax benefit, such
 that aggressiveness will no longer be rewarded.
 A final problem with current law is that although the government
 can rely on the judgments of private parties, it has no opportunity to
 evaluate the soundness of these judgments.138 Unlike an investor in a
 venture capital limited partnership, the government cannot decline to
 reinvest if past investments have performed poorly. In theory, more-
 over, the tax subsidy is available as long as someone buys convertible
 preferred stock - not just a venture capitalist, but also the entrepre-
 neur's unsophisticated father-in-law (although "angel" investors gener-
 ally do not invest through convertible preferred stock139). The subsidy
 is, in effect, a government investment in an index fund composed of all
 startups that can secure external financing. In a direct expenditure
 program, by contrast, the government could decide which co-investors
 to trust. Yet, as noted above, the government is not necessarily up to
 this task. Thus, the absence of a screening process is simply the flip
 side of one of the subsidy's advantages: the government does not make
 project selection choices.
 On balance, then, the subsidy identified here has significant advan-
 tages, as well as potential disadvantages that strike us as largely man-
 ageable. Ultimately, though, our point here is not to advocate particu-
 lar forms of venture capital subsidies; indeed, we have not addressed
 the substantive case for a subsidy at all. Rather, we want only to high-
 light the unusual characteristics of the indirect subsidy that has devel-
 oped. Direct subsidies to foster a venture capital industry are com-
 monplace in other countries, typically with quite limited success.140
 The self-executing subsidy we have highlighted here has characteristics
 - especially the use of properly incentivized intermediaries as the sub-
 sidy's gatekeepers - that may prove useful in such efforts.
 137 See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Plan-
 ning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. I339, I353 (2000) ("As planning becomes widespread, it can undermine
 the morale of conservative taxpayers (a form of deadweight loss) and increase the government's
 administrative costs (e.g., if norms change so that taxpayers are less likely to comply voluntar-
 ily).").
 138 Similarly, the private parties are insulated to an extent from the adverse effects of a poor
 decision because they have senior securities. Yet the economic significance of this protection
 should not be overstated, see supra section II.A.2. We are indebted to Jim Hines for this point.
 139 George W. Fenn et al., The Role of Angel Investors in Financing High-Tech Start-Ups 9-IO
 (i998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
 140 See Gilson, supra note 20, at 45-47.
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 VI. CONCLUSION
 In this Article, we have extended the financial economics literature
 on the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock in venture capital struc-
 ture. We have explained how the use of this security triggers a tax re-
 duction for the intensely incentivized management compensation that
 is central to venture capital contracting. We have also emphasized the
 advantages of this form of self-executing subsidy: the government uses
 properly trained and incentivized private parties, instead of a bureauc-
 racy, as a gatekeeper for the subsidy. More generally, we have illus-
 trated the vital link between tax and capital structure, and have em-
 phasized the need to examine deep institutional detail to illuminate the
 complexities of capital structure and security design.
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